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Enforcement Piggybacking and Multistate Actions 
Elysa M. Dishman* 
Civil enforcement in the United States is uniquely “multienforcer.” 
Numerous public and private enforcers including federal agencies, state 
attorneys general (AGs), and private litigants have overlapping authority 
to enforce myriad federal and state laws. Ideally, enforcers would 
complement one another’s efforts and use their comparative enforcement 
advantages to broaden the scope of enforcement and act as a check on 
underenforcement. But in reality, enforcers are often attracted to the same 
targets—large, public, deep-pocketed corporations. This means that 
multiple enforcers may pursue essentially the same enforcement action, 
arising from the same series of events and against the same target. 
Redundant enforcement actions may be necessary to adequately deter 
future misconduct and compensate victims of corporate fraud. However, 
duplicate actions may simply be the result of enforcers “piggybacking” on 
one another’s efforts and “piling on” to high-profile and lucrative 
enforcement actions. 
Scholarly conversations about enforcement often treat broad 
categories of enforcers as static substitutes for one another rather than 
considering them as dynamic actors who are intertwined together. AGs 
are an example of dynamic enforcers that have changed the enforcement 
landscape by combining together in multistate actions. In some ways, state 
enforcement is a microcosm of the broader multienforcer system, with 
multiple state enforcers who can bring duplicative actions under fifty 
states’ laws. AGs can piggyback in multistate actions much like other 
public and private enforcers routinely do in enforcement actions. 
However, multistate actions don’t merely mimic the dynamics that occur 
in a multienforcer system. Multistate actions are also an innovation that 
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changes the enforcement environment, potentially intensifying the 
practices of piggybacking and piling on in a multienforcer system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Between 2003 and 2011, Deutsche Bank and several other banks 
manipulated the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) to 
generate profits for their traders at the expense of the bank’s 
counterparties.1 When the LIBOR-rigging scandal was exposed, 
enforcers in the United States and abroad took action, including the 
Department of Justice (DOJ), the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC), the New York Department of Financial 
Services (DFS), and the United Kingdom Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA).2 With so many enforcers (and so many 
acronyms!) it is no wonder that, in 2015, Deutsche Bank settled for 
over $2.5 billion, including disgorging its ill-gotten gains and 
paying penalties.3 The Deutsche Bank settlement was the largest 
settlement arising from the LIBOR scandal to date.4 But Deutsche 
Bank was far from finished paying settlements to enforcers over the 
LIBOR scandal. In 2017, Deutsche Bank settled a multistate action 
with forty-five state attorneys general (AGs) for $200 million.5 And 
in 2018, Deutsche Bank settled a private antitrust class action for 
$240 million.6 
The Deutsche Bank enforcement story is not by any means 
unique. Many corporations face multiple enforcement actions 
arising from the same misconduct. It is a function of the 
 
 1. LIBOR is a leading benchmark interest rate used in financial products and 
transactions around the world. See Deutsche Bank’s London Subsidiary Agrees to Plead Guilty in 
Connection with Long-Running Manipulation of LIBOR, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Apr. 23, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/deutsche-banks-london-subsidiary-agrees-plead-guilty-
connection-long-running-manipulation. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. (“Together with approximately $1.744 billion in regulatory penalties and 
disgorgement—$800 million as a result of a Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC) action, $600 million as a result of a New York Department of Financial Services (DFS) 
action, and $344 million as a result of a U.K. Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) action—the 
Justice Department’s criminal penalties bring the total amount of penalties to approximately 
$2.519 billion.”). 
 4. Id. 
 5. A.G. Schneiderman Announces $220 Million Multi-State Settlement with Deutsche Bank 
for Artificially Manipulating Interest Rates, N.Y. OFF. ATT’Y GEN. (Oct. 25, 2017), https://ag.ny. 
gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-announces-220-million-multi-state-settlement-
deutsche-bank. 
 6. Jonathan Stempel, Deutsche Bank to Pay $240 Million to End LIBOR Rigging Lawsuit 
in U.S., REUTERS (Feb. 27, 2018, 3:30 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-deutsche-
bank-libor-settlement/deutsche-bank-to-pay-240-million-to-end-libor-rigging-lawsuit-in-u-
s-idUSKCN1GB32H. 
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“multienforcer” system in the United States, where multiple federal 
agencies, state enforcers, and private litigants have overlapping 
authority to bring enforcement actions.7 This system allows parallel 
civil and criminal actions involving multiple federal agencies, as 
well as concurrent or successive actions by state enforcers and 
private litigants. Thus, the same misconduct committed by a single 
corporation can spark numerous enforcement actions and spawn 
several multimillion-dollar settlements. 
In some instances, multiple enforcement actions may be 
necessary to hold corporations accountable, deter future 
misconduct, and adequately compensate victims.8 When enforcers 
coordinate together, they may achieve efficiencies and act as “force 
multipliers” in their respective efforts to punish and deter fraud.9 
The multienforcer system provides accountability by allowing 
other enforcers to step in to remedy lackluster enforcement 
resulting from problems of agency capture, resource constraints, 
informational disadvantages, and political impediments.10 
But often duplicative actions may more closely resemble 
enforcement “piling on,”11 creating unfair punishments and 
“exceed[ing] what is necessary to rectify the harm and deter future 
violations.”12 “Piling on” occurs when multiple enforcers insist that 
 
 7. See Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence:  
A Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173, 2174–75 (2010) (discussing the multienforcer 
system in the United States with respect to securities enforcement) [hereinafter Rose, 
Multienforcer Approach]. 
 8. See Zachary D. Clopton, Redundant Public-Private Enforcement, 69 VAND. L. REV. 
285, 321–22 (2016). 
 9. Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein Delivers Remarks to the New York City Bar 
White Collar Crime Institute, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (May 9, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa 
/speech/deputy-attorney-general-rod-rosenstein-delivers-remarks-new-york-city-bar-
white-collar [hereinafter, Rosenstein Remarks]. 
 10. See Clopton, supra note 8, at 290, 306; Amanda M. Rose, State Enforcement of National 
Policy: A Contextual Approach (with Evidence from the Securities Realm), 97 MINN. L. REV. 1343, 
1372 (2013) [hereinafter Rose, Contextual Approach]; Mark Totten, The Enforcers & the Great 
Recession, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1611, 1653–61 (2015) [hereinafter Totten, The Enforcers]. 
 11. “Piling on” is a term in football where a player jumps onto an existing pile of 
players who have already successfully tackled the opponent lying at the bottom of the pile. 
Piling on is illegal because it slows down the game, has the potential to injure a player, and 
is an unnecessary action. Piling on may result in a fifteen-yard penalty. See Piling On, 
SPORTINGCHARTS, https://www.sportingcharts.com/dictionary/nfl/piling-on.aspx (last 
visited Sept. 23, 2019). 
 12. Rosenstein Remarks, supra note 9; see also Andrew J. Pincus, Unprincipled Prosecution: 
Abuse of Power and Profiteering in the New “Litigation Swarm”, U.S. CHAMBER INST.  
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each of their own actions arising from the same corporate 
misconduct be resolved with a separate monetary penalty that are, 
in the aggregate, disproportionate to the misconduct at issue.13 Like 
the piling on that happens on the football field, duplicative 
enforcement actions can be unnecessary and potentially harmful 
when a corporation has already been successfully “tackled” by 
another enforcer. Piling on can be the equivalent of an enforcement 
“shakedown” where enforcers duplicate actions in order to extract 
settlements from deep-pocketed corporations.14 In these instances, 
rather than cooperate, enforcers may take a competitive approach 
by bringing redundant actions, each seeking to obtain the  
highest settlement.15 
Closely related to piling on is enforcement “piggybacking.” 
Piggybacking occurs when enforcers replicate or join an 
enforcement action after another enforcer has already invested the 
resources in investigation and litigation.16 Often the action is 
brought to the point of settlement and then other regulators that 
may have done little or no investigative work join or replicate the 
action.17 Piggybacking can yield unfair outcomes for corporate 
defendants.18 At the same time, piggybacking can also be harmful 
to enforcers, who may have reduced incentives to invest resources 
in enforcement actions when other enforcers can simply piggyback 
off their efforts.19 
 
FOR LEGAL REFORM 3–6 (2014), https://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1 
/unprincipled-prosecution.pdf (describing piling on as the swarm enforcement model). 
 13. See Rosenstein Remarks, supra note 9. 
 14. See The Criminalisation of American Business, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 30, 2014), 
https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21614138-companies-must-be-punished-
when-they-do-wrong-legal-system-has-become-extortion (“The formula is simple: find a 
large company that may (or may not) have done something wrong; threaten its managers 
with commercial ruin, preferably with criminal charges; force them to use their shareholders’ 
money to pay an enormous fine to drop the charges in a secret settlement (so no one can 
check the details). Then repeat with another large company.”). 
 15. See Rosenstein Remarks, supra note 9 (“Other times, joint or parallel investigations 
by multiple agencies sound less like singing in harmony, and more like competing attempts 
to sing a solo.”). 
 16. See Clopton, supra note 8, at 287–88; Richard A. Posner, Federalism and the 
Enforcement of Antitrust Laws by State Attorneys General, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 9–10 (2004). 
 17. See Rosenstein Remarks, supra note 9. 
 18. See Rosenstein Remarks, supra note 9; Pincus, supra note 12. 
 19. See Rose, Contextual Approach,  supra note 10, at 1354 (arguing that multiple 
enforcers “creates incentives for enforcers to free-ride on the efforts of others, which may 
lead to less vigorous enforcement overall”). 
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There is a fair amount of finger-pointing in the literature when 
it comes to which enforcers are piggybacking.20  The most common 
target of such finger-pointing tends to be private enforcement—in 
particular, class actions.  Private class actions have been criticized 
for piggybacking on public government enforcement actions.21 
Private attorneys “free ride” on the resources invested by public 
enforcers in order to procure class settlements.22 These actions often 
result in handsome fees to class counsel, but often short-change 
class members.23 Piggybacking in private class actions has been 
colorfully described as an “Oklahoma land rush[] in which the 
filing of [a] public . . . action serves as [a] starting gun for a race 
between private attorneys, all seeking to claim the prize of lucrative 
class action settlements, which public law enforcement has 
gratuitously presented them.”24 
But private enforcers are not the only ones accused of 
piggybacking on other enforcers. Enforcement actions brought by 
AGs have also been accused of piggybacking on private class 
actions.25 Some AGs’ parens patriae actions on behalf of their state 
residents closely resemble or may even duplicate private class 
actions.26 In fact, AGs may hire the class counsel from a class action 
 
 20. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the 
Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 221–25 (1983) [hereinafter Coffee, 
Bounty Hunter]; Posner, supra note 16, at 9–10. 
 21. See Coffee, Bounty Hunter, supra note 20, at 221–25 (describing private litigants as 
“free-riders” when they piggyback on the efforts of public enforcers). 
 22. See id.; William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—And Why 
It Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2150–51 (2004) (“The private attorney can free-ride on these 
[public] efforts . . .  provid[ing] no independent search skills, no special litigation savvy, and 
no nonpoliticized incentives. She simply piles on and runs up the tab.”). 
 23. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Rethinking the Class Action: A Policy Primer on Reform, 62 IND. 
L.J. 625, 633 (1987) (“At its simplest, the classic form of opportunism in class actions is the 
‘sweetheart’ settlement, namely one in which the plaintiff’s attorney trades a high fee award 
for a low recovery.”); Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem 
Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1048 (1995); Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, 
Under the Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051, 1053–54 (1996). 
 24. Coffee, Bounty Hunter, supra note 21, at 228. 
 25. See Posner, supra note 16, at 9–10 (“[I]f the U.S. Department of Justice brings an 
antitrust suit, the state attorneys general may be able to take a free ride on the Department’s 
investment in the litigation, by bringing parallel suits that are then consolidated with the 
Justice Department’s suit.”). 
 26. See Clopton, supra note 8, at 287 (“Permitting the state to sue separately could allow 
state governments to file lawsuits duplicating private class actions, extorting damages from 
defendants while free-riding on the efforts of private attorneys.”); Seth Davis, Implied Public 
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to pursue an action against the same target arising from the same 
misconduct on behalf of state residents who may have also been 
class members.27 AGs have also been criticized for piggybacking on 
federal enforcement actions, essentially free riding on the 
investment of federal enforcers.28 
However, with the rise in prominence of the AG, new 
conversations are emerging about the role AGs play in a 
multienforcer system.29 Instead of being cast solely in a 
piggybacking role, AGs are being lauded for their leading role in 
remedying lackluster federal enforcement and advancing political 
positions.30 AG parens patriae actions have also been championed 
 
Rights of Action, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 45 (2014) (stating that parens patriae actions are 
“particularly likely to present many of the same problems as private class action 
enforcement”); Susan Beth Farmer, More Lessons from the Laboratories: Cy Pres Distributions in 
Parens Patriae Antitrust Actions Brought by State Attorneys General, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 361, 
362 (1999); Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State 
Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486, 499–500 (2012) [hereinafter Lemos, Aggregate 
Litigation]; William H. Pryor, Jr., A Comparison of Abuses and Reforms of Class Actions and 
Multigovernment Lawsuits, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1885, 1899 (2000); Amy J. Wildermuth, Why State 
Standing in Massachusetts v. EPA Matters, 27 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 273, 300 (2007); 
Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387, 512 (1995)  
(“The parens patriae label . . . often merely dresses up actions that private parties could easily 
bring.”); Elysa M. Dishman, Class Action Squared: Multistate Actions and Agency Dilemmas (J. 
Reuben Clark Law Sch., Brigham Young Univ., Research Paper No. 18-21, 2018), https:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=3252149. 
 27. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, Miss. ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 
571 U.S. 161 (2014) (No. 12-1036) (“[W]hat prevents attorneys general from around the 
country sitting back and waiting until . . . the plaintiffs’ class prevails, taking the same 
complaint, maybe even hiring the same lawyers, to go and say, well, now we are going to 
bring our parens patriae action. We know how the trial is going to work out or we know 
what the settlement is going to look like, and we are going to get the same amount of money 
for the State?”); Margaret H. Lemos, Privatizing Public Litigation, 104 GEO. L.J. 515, 532–33 
(2016) [hereinafter Lemos, Privatizing Public Litigation]. 
 28. See Posner, supra note 16, at 9–10. 
 29. See PAUL NOLETTE, FEDERALISM ON TRIAL 21–22 (2015); Margaret H. Lemos & Ernst 
Young, State Public Law Litigation in an Age of Polarization, 87 TEX. L. REV. 43, 45 (2018); Paul 
Nolette & Colin Provost, Change and Continuity in the Role of State Attorneys General in the 
Obama and Trump Administrations, 48 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 469, 470 (2018); see also Rachel 
M. Cohen, The Hour of the Attorneys General, AM. PROSPECT (Mar. 22, 2017), https:// 
prospect.org/article/hour-attorneys-general. 
 30. See Totten, The Enforcers, supra note 10, at 1611–13, 1657; Mark Totten, The Rise of 
State Attorneys General a Boon to Democracy, THE HILL (July 6, 2017, 1:00 PM), https://the 
hill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/state-local-politics/340841-the-rise-of-the-state-attorney-
generals-is-boon-to. 
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to fill an enforcement void caused by the decline of the oft-criticized 
private class action.31 
The emerging role of the AG and the rise of multistate actions 
has changed the enforcement landscape. But the phenomenon has 
garnered little scholarly attention.32 While there is a growing 
literature comparing private and public law enforcement, this 
scholarship focuses on how private and public enforcers are 
substitutes for one another, rather than considering how they 
interact together and duplicate enforcement actions.33 These 
scholarly conversations treat broad categories of enforcers as static 
substitutes for one another, rather than dynamic players in an 
integrated and changing enforcement environment. When scholars 
have considered interactions between federal, state, and private 
enforcers in a multienforcer system, they consider these enforcers 
generally along the same public and private distinction.34 Few 
scholars have considered horizontal enforcement relationships, 
such as relationships among federal agencies or states, and their 
effect on overall enforcement levels.35 And to date, no scholar has 
comprehensively considered the relationships among the states as 
enforcers in a multienforcer system, particularly in the context of 
multistate actions. This Article fills that gap by analyzing the 
relationships among AGs in multistate actions and how multistate 
actions interact with other enforcement actions to affect the overall 
level of enforcement. This Article argues that the same type of 
 
 31. See Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of 
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 660 (2012) (“In our view, state attorneys 
general—alone among public enforcers—have the ability to fill the void left by class actions, 
primarily through expanded use of the parens patriae powers that are currently on the books 
in most states.”). 
 32. See Colin Provost, An Integrated Model of U.S. State Attorney General Behavior in 
Multi-State Litigation, 10 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q., 1, 2 (2010) [hereinafter Provost, An Integrated 
Model] (“Multi-state litigation deserves scholarly attention because its dynamics are . . . 
poorly understood, yet the key players involved believe . . . it has had profound effects on 
regulatory governance.”); Totten, The Enforcers, supra note 10, at 1664 (“[T]he role of 
multistate and multigovernment actions remains understudied.”). 
 33. See Clopton, supra note 8, at 291 (“[T]he enforcement literature often ignores 
redundant public-private enforcement.”). 
 34. See Coffee, Bounty Hunter, supra note 21, at 215; Rose, Multienforcer Approach, supra 
note 7, at 2200. 
 35. See Allen Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 MINN. L. REV. 493, 549 (2008); Lemos, 
Aggregate Litigation, supra note 26, at 524–25; Max Minzner, Should Agencies Enforce?, 99 MINN. 
L. REV. 2113, 2173 (2015). 
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dynamics that occur more broadly in the multienforcer system also 
occur among states in multistate actions. 
Multistate actions allow multiple states to coordinate together 
and leverage their shared resources to mount national scale 
litigation.36 Multistate actions may serve as an efficient mechanism 
to vacuum-fill for lackluster federal enforcement and hold 
corporations accountable when individual states may not be able to 
do so alone.37 
However, the piggybacking that occurs in the broader 
multienforcer system also occurs in multistate actions. Multistate 
actions can pile on existing enforcement actions, dramatically 
increasing the penalties in a corporate enforcement action by virtue 
of expanding the number of enforcers. The organization of 
multistate actions also encourages piggybacking, allowing many 
states to free ride on the efforts of leading state AGs.38 When states 
can participate in enforcement actions at little cost, but still reap 
large settlements, they may be incentivized to over-enforce. The 
potential for overenforcement may be compounded when federal 
enforcers and class action lawyers are attracted to the same types 
of targets as multistate enforcers—namely, large corporations that 
operate nationally and can pay settlements. When all enforcers and 
their resources are concentrated on a certain type of target, the 
potential for overenforcement increases dramatically. 
At the same time, however, it is hard to feel too sympathetic to 
large corporations engaged in misconduct like Deutsche Bank.  But 
nevertheless, there are problems with over-enforcing against large 
corporations. First, it is unfair to punish a corporate defendant 
beyond what is necessary to rectify the harm created and deter 
future misconduct. But it isn’t just unfair to the corporate entity. 
Often, the real people who bear the burden of enforcement 
penalties are shareholders, employees, and other stakeholders.39 
 
 36. See Totten, The Enforcers, supra note 10, at 1662–63. 
 37. See id. 
 38. See NOLETTE, supra note 29, at 26–27 (“Many states participate in multistate 
litigation, but only a few states typically take a leading role in these efforts.”). 
 39. See Rosenstein Remarks, supra note 9. Judge Rakoff, concerned that a settlement 
would solely harm the shareholders of a large corporation, opined that enforcement 
penalties that are paid by the corporation are not paid by the culpable party, but rather paid 
by the shareholders, which is “half-baked justice at best.”  Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Bank of Am. 
Corp., Nos. 09 Civ. 6829(JSR), 10 Civ. 0215(JSR), 2010 WL 624581, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 
2010). 
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Second, it is inefficient. Overenforcement decreases beneficial risk-
taking and prompts overinvestment in internal corporate 
monitoring.40 It ties up resources and capital in excessive 
settlements that are not socially beneficial.41 It also can significantly 
delay resolution of investigations as companies reasonably 
postpone resolution while they assess the universe of their 
potential exposure.42 
But the tendency to over-enforce is not the only problem. 
Ironically, state enforcement piggybacking simultaneously creates 
the potential for both overenforcement and underenforcement. 
When all enforcers focus their resources and efforts on large 
corporate targets, it deprives enforcement resources from other 
targets that may cause more localized harm but lack the deep-
pockets to pay large fines or create splashy headlines.43 When AGs 
focus their time and resources on targets that have already drawn 
the attention of federal or private enforcers, it reduces the ability of 
the multienforcer system to reach a broader range of cases and 
provide the social benefits of wider compensation and deterrence.  
This paper has three parts. Part I discusses the multienforcer 
model and how multiple enforcers exercise overlapping 
enforcement authority. Part II discusses the dynamics that occur 
among states in multistate actions and how multistate actions affect 
levels of enforcement. Part III discusses potential solutions to 
calibrate the multienforcer system, including multistate actions, to 
yield more optimal levels of enforcement. 
I. THE MULTIENFORCER SYSTEM 
The United States deploys multiple enforcers to pursue 
violations of myriad federal and state laws.44 Overlapping 
authority to enforce federal and state laws can vest in multiple 
 
 40. See Rose, Multienforcer Approach, supra note 7, at 2184–88; see generally Pincus, supra 
note 12. 
 41. See Pincus, supra note 12. at 12–14; see also The Criminalisation of American Business, 
supra note 14. 
 42. See Rosenstein Remarks, supra note 9. 
 43. See Colin Provost, When Is AG Short for Aspiring Governor?: Ambition and Policy 
Making Dynamics in the Office of State Attorney General, 40 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 597 (2009) 
[hereinafter Provost, Aspiring Governor]. 
 44. See Rose, Multienforcer Approach, supra note 7, at 2174 (“The United States employs 
a mishmash of enforcers to deter fraud in its national securities markets.”). 
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public and private enforcers.45 This means that, in certain instances, 
federal agencies, AGs, and private litigants can all pursue the same 
target based on the same underlying sets of facts.46 
A. Meet the Enforcers 
Within the broad categories of public and private enforcement, 
there are numerous federal agencies, state attorneys general, state 
regulators, and private litigants and their lawyers.47 Public 
enforcers are government enforcers, such as federal agencies and 
AGs. Public enforcers are charged with promoting the public 
interest.48 In contrast, private enforcers are privately-funded 
attorneys who pursue causes of action to vindicate their clients’ 
rights and seek damages on their behalf.49 Private enforcers are 
often entrepreneurial lawyers bringing private causes of actions in 
aggregate litigation, such as class actions.50 
1. Federal enforcers: The expert enforcers 
 The typical federal enforcer is a specialized federal agency 
headed by a political appointee.51 Federal agencies are overseen  
by the President and Congress.52 The President has the power  
to appoint most heads of agencies and can remove them at  
will.53 Congress oversees federal agencies by appropriating funds 
for agency budgets, legislating agency responsibilities,  
and supervising agencies through congressional oversight 
committees.54 Presidential and Congressional supervision injects 
politics into federal enforcement, with political pressures  
 
 45. See id. at 2200–03; see also Clopton, supra note 8, at 296–99. 
 46. See Rose, Multienforcer Approach, supra note 7, at 2200–03. 
 47. See Lemos, Privatizing Public Litigation, supra note 27, at 524–27. 
 48. See id. at 521. 
 49. See id. 
 50. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness 
and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 882–83 (1987) (hereinafter, 
Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation). 
 51. See Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 721 
(2016) [hereinafter, Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law]. 
 52. See id. at 717. 
 53. See Rachel Brakow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional 
Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 16 (2010). 
 54. See Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, supra note 51,  at 717. 
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dictating whether political overseers demand more or less  
agency enforcement.   
Federal statutes provide civil enforcement authority to federal 
agencies with subject-matter expertise in particular areas.55 Many 
federal agencies have an enforcement arm tasked with enforcing 
federal law within the agency’s area of regulatory expertise.56  
However, far from being completely siloed, many different federal 
agencies have overlapping enforcement authority.57 For example, 
there is significant overlap between the enforcement authority of 
the SEC and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC).58 There is also overlap between civil and criminal 
enforcement, with one or more specialist federal agencies enforcing 
civil infractions and the DOJ enforcing the criminal violations.59 
Similarly, in securities cases, the SEC and DOJ may simultaneously 
bring civil and criminal enforcement actions.60 This means, as a 
practical matter, that multiple federal agencies may bring actions 
not just against the same corporation but also arising from the same 
corporation’s misconduct.61  
The expertise of federal enforcers makes them unique among 
enforcers. Federal enforcers are generally lawyers who are 
embedded in a federal agency with other non-lawyer experts. 
Federal agencies have considerable interaction with regulated 
entities, which provides them expertise about the industries they 
regulate.62 Agencies also have rulemaking power that can inform 
their enforcement actions and allow them to take a more holistic 
approach to regulation and enforcement.63 Agencies can respond to 
misconduct with their rulemaking power, by bringing enforcement 
actions, or both.  
Federal enforcers’ expertise makes them well suited to consider 
national interests in enforcement, including the effects of their 
enforcement actions on the national economy and financial 
 
 55. See id. 
 56. See Minzner, supra note 35, at 2114–15. 
 57. See id. at 2144 (“Misconduct by a defendant does not necessarily stay neatly within 
the lines draw[n] by statute.”). 
 58. See id. at 2117, 2173. 
 59. See id. at 2115. 
 60. See id. at 2144. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See id. at 2157; Rose, Contextual Approach, supra note 10, at 1354. 
 63. See Minzner, supra note 35, at 2150. 
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markets. They often focus their enforcement efforts on actions that 
have national scope and are charged with serving the national 
interest.64 While private and state enforcers have incentives to 
impose externalities outside their private or state interests, federal 
enforcers are supposed to internalize the national costs and benefits 
of their enforcement decisions.65  
A justification for a concurrent enforcement system is that it 
expands the pool of enforcement resources by adding private and 
state enforcement resources. Federal agencies have resource 
constraints that require agencies to make decisions about which 
actions to pursue.  Inviting private enforcers to enforce federal law 
shifts enforcement costs from the general public to private parties 
who self-finance enforcement actions. Expanding enforcement 
resources is also a justification for delegating enforcement authority 
of federal laws to AGs. When multiple AGs’ offices, in addition to 
the federal agency, have the authority to enforce federal law, 
enforcement resources are greatly expanded by increasing the 
number of enforcers. AGs can also act as a check on federal 
underenforcement if they can also enforce federal laws.  
A major critique of federal enforcement is that federal agencies 
are particularly vulnerable to capture by the entities they regulate.66 
Capture occurs when agencies become controlled by regulated 
entities to the detriment of the public.67 Regulated entities are 
highly-organized and well-financed, especially compared to the 
general public and public interest groups.68 Because regulated 
entities have considerable exposure to enforcement, they are highly 
incentivized to closely monitor agency decisions and seek to 
 
 64. See Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, supra note 51, at 701. 
 65. See Rose, Multienforcer Approach, supra note 7, at 2206. 
 66. Capture may be defined as responsiveness to the desires of the industry or groups 
being regulated. See Roger G. Noll, REFORMING REGULATION 99–100 (1971) (explaining that 
capture happens most often when an agency assigns undue weight to the interests of the 
regulated industries as against those of the public); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of 
American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1713 (1975) (“It has become widely 
accepted, not only by public interest lawyers, but by academic critics, legislators, judges, and 
even by some agency members, that the comparative overrepresentation of regulated or 
client interests in the process of agency decision results in a persistent policy bias in favor 
of . . . [those] interests.”(footnotes omitted)). 
 67. See Minzner, supra note 35, at 2137 (explaining agency capture as a principal-agent 
problem). 
 68. See Brakow, supra note 53, at 22. 
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exercise influence over agency actions.69 Regulated entities also 
have the resources to challenge agency decisions and enforcement 
actions. Agencies know they will have to invest considerable 
resources in enforcement against these types of targets and may 
underenforce when presented with more challenging and resource-
intensive actions.70   
Agency capture is further exacerbated by the political oversight 
of federal agencies. Industry groups are well-positioned to make 
political campaign contributions and to lobby, which in turn gives 
them influence with the agency’s overseers on the relevant 
oversight committees. For example, agencies may find themselves 
threatened with budget cuts for enforcement deemed too 
aggressive by their congressional overseers.71  
The “revolving door phenomenon” also contributes to capture 
when federal enforcers move from being agency employees to 
positions in the private sector and back again. Federal enforcers are 
salaried government employees and are not directly compensated 
based on the outcome of individual cases.72 This helps them make 
decisions outside of purely financial motivations.73 But federal 
enforcers are also enticed into the private sector where there are 
more lucrative opportunities. Federal agency heads and attorneys 
often follow a career path that leads them to the private sector after 
a brief stint in government.74 Strong incentives exist to sell out the 
agency to curry favor with private sector attorneys.75 Such 
attorneys tend to avoid difficult or complicated cases, focusing 
instead on developing trial experience or a winning record.76 
 
 69. See Minzner, supra note 35, at 2137. 
 70. See Brakow, supra note 53, at 22 (“All else being equal, agencies would prefer not 
be mired in legal challenges, so they may seek to work with, rather than against these 
organized interests.”). 
 71. For example, Arthur Levitt, the Chair of the SEC from 1993–2001 describes the SEC 
during his tenure as being constantly threatened with budget cuts by the SEC’s congressional 
overseers if it pursued aggressive regulations. See Arthur Levitt with Paula Dwyer, TAKE ON 
THE STREET 132–33 (2002). 
 72. See Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For Profit Public Enforcement, 127 HARV. L. 
REV. 853, 863 (2014). 
 73. But see generally id. (arguing that federal agencies, like all enforcers, have financial 
motives in enforcement). 
 74. See Brakow, supra note 53, at 23. 
 75. See id. 
 76. See Lemos & Minzner, supra note 72, at 859. 
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Public attention and current events play an important role in 
the impact of agency capture. The impact of capture is greater when 
the public is not paying attention to an agency’s enforcement.  
When the public is not paying attention, federal enforcement 
agencies face substantial pressure from regulated entities “to 
undercharge, undersettle, and undercollect in enforcement 
actions.”77 Further compounding the problem, courts provide 
agencies considerable deference regarding their enforcement 
decisions, making it even more difficult to challenge enforcement 
agency capture.78 
But in times of high public scrutiny following major corporate 
fraud, agencies are very concerned about their reputation to be 
aggressive enforcers.79  Specialized agencies face political pressure 
in the wake of problems that drives an overreaction to enforcement 
failures.80 When multiple agencies feel the same pressure from 
current events, the pendulum can swing too far in the other 
direction and multiple agencies may all target the same 
corporations for the same misconduct. 
2. State attorneys general: The elected enforcers 
In contrast, AGs are generalist enforcers, most of whom are 
directly elected by their state citizenry.81 AGs are the state’s “chief 
legal officer,” controlling litigation on behalf of the state and 
engaging in public advocacy by bringing civil enforcement 
actions.82 The AG has “wide discretion in making the determination 
as to the public interest[,]” including in bringing enforcement 
 
 77. Minzner, supra note 35, at 2139. 
 78. See id. at 2120–21. 
 79. See id. at 2141 (“Specialized agencies care about appearing aggressive, but only 
when the public is focused on enforcement.”). 
 80. See id. 
 81. Forty-three of the nation’s attorneys general are elected statewide separately from 
the governor or other state institutions. State AGs are appointed in the other seven states: 
Alaska, Hawaii, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Tennessee, and Wyoming. In Maine, 
the attorney general is selected by the state legislature and, in Tennessee, by the state 
supreme court. In the other five states, Alaska, Hawaii, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and 
Wyoming, the attorney general is appointed by the governor. See William P. Marshall, Break 
Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 
115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2448 n.3 (2006). 
 82. See Jason Lynch, Note, Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the Role of State Attorneys 
General in Multistate Litigation, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1998, 2002 (2001). 
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actions against corporations.83 While federal enforcers are generally 
specialized agencies, AGs are generalist enforcers. They have broad 
jurisdiction and expansive authority that not only provides the 
discretion to set their enforcement agendas but also the ability to 
pursue far-reaching policy initiatives through their enforcement 
efforts.84 However, each AG possessing such discretion creates the 
potential for more than fifty different approaches to the exercise of 
enforcement discretion and the “balkanization” of regulation.85   
Like federal enforcers, AGs and their staffs are not directly 
compensated by the outcomes in particular cases and are salaried 
public servants.86 However, in contrast to federal enforcers,  
AGs tend to have smaller staffs and face more significant budget 
constraints than their federal counterparts.87 At the same time,  
AGs are generalists, with enforcement agendas that span myriad 
issues.88 Their resources are often pulled over many  
enforcement priorities and they must carefully ration their scarce  
enforcement resources. 
AGs have traditionally enforced state law and they have a 
comparative advantage in state law enforcement. They are directly 
elected by their state constituents, providing them a strong 
incentive to serve their constituents’ interests. They are also more 
likely to respond to local concerns and interests that may be 
neglected by a federal enforcer.89 Their local presence provides 
them a better understanding of state issues and greater proximity 
to local information.90   
 
 83. Florida ex rel. Shevin, 526 F.2d 266, 268–69 (5th Cir. 1976); see also Fenney v. 
Commonwealth, 366 N.E.2d 1262, 1266–67 (Mass. 1977) (holding the AG possesses ultimate 
authority over litigation); Lynch, supra note 82, at 2003. 
 84. See Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, supra note 51 at 724. 
 85. See id. at 719; Rose, Contextual Approach, supra note 10, at 1368. 
 86. But both federal enforcers and AG offices may benefit from “revolving funds” that 
allow these enforcers to keep a portion of enforcement penalties to fund their offices. See 
Lemos & Minzner, supra note 72, at 861–62, 864. 
 87. See Lemos & Minzner, supra note 72, at 859. 
 88. See Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, supra note 51, at 717  
(“State enforcement also empowers a different set of agents—elected, generalist  
attorneys general.”). 
 89. Id. at 721. 
 90. See Stephen Calkins, Perspectives on State and Federal Antitrust Enforcement, 53 DUKE 
L.J. 673, 679–80 (2003). 
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However, in addition to enforcing state law, AGs are also 
increasingly enforcing federal law.91 State enforcement of federal 
law allows AGs to vacuum-fill or hedge against lackluster federal 
enforcement “due to capture, bureaucratic pathologies, political 
influence, or resource limitations.”92 AGs are less likely to be a 
target for industry capture or experience revolving door problems 
with their enforcement attorneys.93 That being said, as AGs rise in 
prominence as national enforcers, they are becoming more 
attractive to lobbyists, which may make the office more vulnerable 
to capture in the future.94   
Elections may also motivate AGs to make enforcement 
decisions based on their future political ambitions, rather than the 
public good.95 For example, an AG may be tempted to favor 
enforcement actions that promise quick settlements and draw 
splashy headlines,96 or may become beholden to lobbyists who help 
fund future campaigns.97  
State election of AGs may also create enforcement externalities 
on other states when AGs enforce their state laws in such a way as 
to impose costs on other states to which they are not democratically 
accountable.98 If a state can bring an enforcement action and impose 
large penalties against an out-of-state defendant at little cost to 
itself, it is in the state’s interest to do so, even if it imposes 
externalities on other states or on the rest of the country in the shape 
of overdeterrence costs.99 
3. Private enforcers: The economic enforcers  
Public and private enforcers are typically distinguished by their 
financial incentives. Private enforcement is driven by profit, while 
public enforcement is not. Private enforcement focuses on 
 
 91. See Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, supra note 51, at 702–03. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See Rose, Contextual Approach, supra note 10, at 1354. 
 94. See Eric Lipton, Lobbyists, Bearing Gifts, Pursue Attorneys General, N.Y. TIMES  
(Oct. 29, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/29/us/lobbyists-bearing-gifts-pursue-
attorneys-general.html. 
 95. See Provost, Aspiring Governor, supra note 43, at 604. 
 96. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Constructing Issue Classes, 101 VA. L. REV. 1855,  
1924 (2015). 
 97. See Lipton, supra note 94. 
 98. See Rose, Contextual Approach, supra note 10, at 1347. 
 99. See id. at 1371. 
002.DISHMAN_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/14/20  1:53 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2019 
438 
 
vindicating private rights and is primarily financially motivated.100 
Private enforcement relies on the private attorneys motivated by 
fees to bring private causes of actions to enforce the law.101 While 
private enforcers stand to directly financially benefit from 
successful enforcement actions, public enforcers do not. These 
profit incentives create an active system of private enforcement that 
supplements public enforcement by federal and state enforcers.102  
Private enforcement’s comparative advantage is that it is 
economical and focuses on compensating injuries and vindicating 
private rights. It is economical in the sense that private enforcement 
only occurs if the benefits of financial recovery outweigh the cost of 
enforcement. Private enforcement is also efficient because it pushes 
some of the expense of enforcement to private parties instead of 
taxpayers who fund public enforcement.103 Privatizing 
enforcement can more efficiently provide compensation to injured 
parties because those who are primarily benefiting from the 
enforcement action are also financing it. Private enforcement may 
also produce a socially beneficial deterrent byproduct. When 
corporations are required to pay damages, they internalize the costs 
of their misconduct and may be deterred in the future. 
Furthermore, because private enforcers are a diverse and 
disorganized group, they are not vulnerable to capture, unlike their 
public enforcement counterparts.104 
However, the singular focus on advancing private interests 
means that private enforcement ignores the costs and benefits to 
others.105 The calculus of private enforcers is that, as long their 
 
 100. See Lemos, Privatizing Public Litigation, supra note 27, at 521. 
 101. See John C. Coffee Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L. 
REV. 229, 245 (2007). 
 102. See id. at 246 (“In the United States, public enforcement of law is supplemented by 
a vigorous, arguably even hyperactive, system of private enforcement. Relying on class 
actions and an entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ bar motivated by contingent fees, the US system of 
private ‘enforcement by bounty hunter’ appears in fact to exact greater annual aggregate 
sanctions than do its public enforcers. This system has no true functional analogue anywhere 
else in the world.”). 
 103. See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 31, at 626 (“One can imagine a world where 
public agencies assume primary (or even sole) responsibility for the detection,  
investigation, and litigation of public frauds . . . [b]ut . . . one would be imagining a very 
different world—one that provides orders of magnitude more resources to state and local 
enforcement agencies.”). 
 104. See Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, supra note 51, at 707. 
 105. See id. at 706. 
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expected private benefit exceeds their expected costs, they will 
bring action.106 This means that action will be brought even if 
liability is questionable or if the action creates social overdeterrence 
costs.107 This outcome yields a system where private enforcement is 
not well calibrated to the amount of enforcement that is socially 
desirable.108 When the potential financial recovery is high, private 
enforcement is prone to overenforcement. However, when the 
enforcement action will have a socially valuable deterrent effect but 
offers little financial reward to plaintiffs, private enforcement may 
lead to underenforcement.109 
Private enforcement only relies on aggregate actions, like class 
actions, to provide compensation and deterrence when there are 
widespread injuries but low individual damages. Private class 
actions provide a mechanism to address this scenario where private 
action would otherwise be uneconomical. However, the incentives 
of class counsel can undermine the value of private enforcement. 
For example, when class counsel enters into “sweetheart 
settlements” that provide class counsel handsome fees and sell out 
class members with little or no recovery, it undermines the 
compensation and deterrence objectives of private enforcement.110 
The strengths, weaknesses, and incentives of each broad type of 
enforcer are meant to counterbalance one another and ensure that 
each enforcer can use its comparative advantages in a socially 
beneficial manner. The multienforcer system is meant to remedy an 
underenforcement problem by inviting multiple enforcers to act in 
a world of scarce resources and spread these resources over broad 
and diverse enforcement actions. 
B. Overlapping Enforcement 
Concurrent federal, state, and private enforcement is 
commonplace in the United States.111 Many substantive areas of the 
 
 106. See Rose, Multienforcer Approach, supra note 7 at 2201. 
 107. See id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 706–07. 
 110. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Rethinking the Class Action: A Policy Primer on Reform, 62 IND. 
L.J. 625, 633 (1986) (“At its simplest, the classic form of opportunism in class actions is the 
‘sweetheart’ settlement, namely one in which the plaintiff’s attorney trades a high fee award 
for a low recovery.”). 
 111. See Rose, Contextual Approach, supra note 10, at 1351. 
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law provide multiple enforcers the ability to maintain separate but 
overlapping actions.112 As a practical matter, this  means that “state, 
federal[,] and private enforcement often punish the same 
conduct.”113 This may include parallel criminal and civil 
enforcement actions from multiple federal agencies, individual 
state and/or multistate actions, and private class actions and 
derivative suits.114 The overlap can occur with contemporaneous 
actions or sequential actions from multiple enforcers.115 This 
overlap, rather than being a product of cooperation and 
predetermination, is “more the product of historical happenstance 
than coherent design choices.”116 
Certain conditions allow enforcement overlap to occur. First, 
the law provides overlapping enforcement authority to multiple 
enforcers. Several areas of the law provide authority for multiple 
enforcers to act, such as securities, environmental, antitrust, and 
consumer protection enforcement.117  
For example, the securities law enforcement regime provides 
authority to multiple enforcers to bring overlapping actions.118 
Federal securities laws provide enforcement authority to federal 
agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).119 
These laws also allow for private rights of action that are enforced 
through private enforcers, such as securities class actions.120 States 
 
 112. See Clopton, supra note 8, at 292. 
 113. Minzner, supra note 35, at 2144. 
 114. See Rosenstein Remarks, supra note 9. 
 115. See Minzner, supra note 35,  at 2142. 
 116. Rose, Multienforcer Approach, supra note 7, at 2175. 
 117. See Clopton, supra note 8, at 296–99; Rose, Contextual Approach, supra note 10,  
at 1345. 
 118. See Rose, Multienforcer Approach, supra note 7, at 2175 (“Thus, in addition to facing 
federal fraud liability at the hands of both the SEC and class action plaintiffs, participants  
in the U.S. national securities markets also face potential fraud liability at the hands of fifty  
state governments.”). 
 119. Id. 
 120. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009) (prohibiting inter alia, the making of an 
“untrue statement of material fact” when buying or selling securities); see also Rose, 
Multienforcer Approach, supra note 7, at 2174 (“Most controversially, it relies upon class action 
lawyers to supplement the SEC’s enforcement of Rule 10b-5, the primary antifraud provision 
in federal securities law.”). For a criticism of the claim that private enforcement supplements 
SEC enforcement, see Maria Correia & Michael Kluasner, Are Securities Class Actions 
“Supplemental” to SEC Enforcement? An Empirical Analysis (unpublished manuscript), 
https://efmaefm.org/0EFMAMEETINGS/EFMA%20ANNUAL%20MEETINGS/2013-
Reading/papers/EFMA2013_0593_fullpaper.pdf. 
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also have the authority to enforce their own state securities laws.121 
For example, the New York Attorney General has used the state’s 
securities fraud statute, the Martin Act, to bring a series of 
enforcement actions against large financial institutions.122  
Another example of overlapping enforcement authority is in 
the area of consumer protection law.  Federal agencies, such as the 
Consumer Protection Financial Bureau (CPFB), have the authority  
to enforce federal law.123 Federal law also delegates authority to 
AGs to enforce consumer protection law.124 States also have state 
consumer protection laws, known as unfair and deceptive acts and 
practices (UDAP) laws.125 And private enforcers also bring class 
actions based on consumer protection theories.126 
Second, overlap is created by enforcer discretion, or the 
considerable independence and choice that enforcers have in 
choosing their enforcement agenda and pursuing enforcement 
actions.127 Both federal and state enforcers have tremendous 
discretion to choose which actions to bring against which target and 
what type of settlement or sanctions to pursue.128 Private attorneys 
also have the ability to choose their cases.129 Furthermore, private 
attorneys acting as class counsel also have considerable leeway 
 
 121. See National Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (NSMIA), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c)(1) 
(2012) (preserving state’s antifraud securities statutes from preemption). 
 122. See, e.g., N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 352 to 359-h (McKinney 2015) (“Martin Act”) 
(providing New York State Attorney General authority to enforce state securities laws). For 
a discussion on how the New York State Attorney General has enforced the Martin Act, see 
Jeff Izant, Note, Mens Rea and the Martin Act, A Weapon of Choice Among Securities Regulators?, 
2012 COLUM. L. REV. 913 (2012). 
 123. See Minzner, supra note 35, at 2117. 
 124. See Dodd-Frank Act § 1036(a)(l)(B), 12 U.S.C. § 5536 (2012) (authorizing state 
parens patriae enforcement of federal financial consumer protection law); Lemos, State 
Enforcement of Federal Law, supra note 51, at 700–01, 708–09; Amy Widman & Prentiss Cox, 
State Attorneys General Use of Concurrent Public Enforcement Authority in Federal Consumer 
Protection Laws, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 53, 53 (2011). 
 125. See Prentiss Cox, Amy Widman & Mark Totten, Strategies of Public UDAP 
Enforcement, 55 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 37, 38 (2018). 
 126. See Howard M. Erichson, Coattail Class Actions: Reflections on Microsoft, Tobacco, and 
the Mixing of Public and Private Lawyering in Mass Litigation, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2000). 
 127. See Lemos, Privatizing Public Litigation, supra note 27, at 524 (explaining that 
government and private litigation vests litigants with significant discretion); Prentiss Cox, 
Public Enforcement Compensation and Private Rights, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2313, 2316 (2016). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Lawyers generally have the professional right to choose their cases. See MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16 (2018). 
002.DISHMAN_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/14/20  1:53 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2019 
442 
 
directing class actions and negotiating the settlement on behalf of 
class members.130 
Third, enforcers have incentives to pursue overlapping actions.  
Most predictably, private enforcers are incentivized to pursue 
actions that produce large settlements and attorneys’ fees.  
Incentives with respect to public enforcers, however, can be more 
difficult to identify. Federal enforcers may pursue cases that are 
within their agency’s expertise and raise issues of national scope. 
They may have financial motivations when they pursue particular 
actions because large settlements  provide reputational benefits for 
the agency, or the agency may be able to keep a portion of the 
penalties from its enforcement actions.131 AGs may be motivated to 
prioritize local issues that are important to their voters or step in 
when federal enforcers have failed to act. AGs may also seek high-
profile targets and large settlements for the publicity that may help 
them in future campaigns.132  
Because public and private enforcers have different incentives, 
it stands to reason that they will use their discretion to pursue 
different types of actions.133 However, it may be that all enforcers 
are often incentivized to pursue the same type of action. Overlap 
occurs when all enforcers are attracted to the same type of cases. 
These cases are often high-profile actions against major national 
and multinational corporations. Actions against large corporate 
defendants have the prospects of high financial settlements and 
attract all types of enforcers. For example, private enforcers 
interested in attorneys’ fees, federal enforcers focused on 
enforcement reputation, and AGs planning to campaign on a 
“tough on fraud” campaign platform. 
But the financial incentives may not be enough to explain why 
public enforcers may be attracted to actions against major 
corporations. Actions against corporate targets may also be of 
particular national importance because of their role in interstate 
commerce and their potentially complex nature that may call for 
 
 130. The considerable discretion vested in class counsel, combined with little oversight 
from class members, is central to the agency cost critique of class actions. See John C. Coffee, 
Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 
100 COLUM. L. REV. 370 (2000); Dishman, supra note 26. 
 131. See Lemos & Minzner, supra note 72, at 856–57, 863. 
 132. See Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 26, at 498. 
 133. See Lemos, Privatizing Public Litigation, supra note 27, at 524. 
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the expertise of a federal enforcer. AGs may also be attracted to the 
same type of enforcement target because their state residents were 
particularly affected by the misconduct or because federal enforcers 
have failed to bring action.134 
While it may be necessary in some instances to have 
overlapping actions, more often in the context of major corporate 
fraud, there is a danger of over-enforcing these types of actions at 
the expense of pursuing other actions. The overenforcement in this 
category of actions means that, with scarce enforcement resources, 
other types of actions will go under-enforced, such as small-scale 
fraudsters, Ponzi schemes, and other less splashy but important 
enforcement areas. This leaves victims of these types of frauds 
uncompensated and fails to deter certain types of misconduct  
that are also deserving of enforcement resources. This means that it 
is possible to over-enforce certain types of actions or certain  
types of targets but under-enforce other types of cases against 
different targets. 
When there is overenforcement in the multienforcer system, it 
is difficult to calibrate the multienforcer system to reduce levels of 
enforcement. If an enforcer has the legal authority, discretion, and 
all the incentives to proceed, arguments about unfairness to 
corporations (whose misconduct may not make them particularly 
sympathetic) may not be enough to encourage enforcers to exercise 
restraint. Furthermore, enforcement tends to have a “ratchet up” 
effect where enforcers that advocate for less enforcement are easily 
trumped by other enforcers pursuing actions.135 These dynamics 
make it difficult to change the current system to approach more 
optimal levels of enforcement. “The hard question for system 
designers is how to achieve an optimal mix of public and private 
litigation so as to leverage the strengths, and compensate for the 
weaknesses, of each model.”136 
 
 134. See Totten, The Enforcers, supra note 10, at 1615, 1652–53 (arguing that AGs took the 
lead on enforcement during and the wake of the financial crisis when federal enforcers failed 
to do so). 
 135. See Rose, Multienforcer Approach, supra note 7, at 2205. 
 136. Lemos, Privatizing Public Litigation, supra note 27, at 528. 
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C. Piggybacking in a Multienforcer System 
The potential for overlap in a multienforcer system makes it 
prone to piggybacking among enforcers.137 Piggybacking has 
generally been considered to be negative, with enforcers free riding 
on the efforts of other enforcers without adding any additional 
value by duplicating their efforts.138 Piggybacking can be 
problematic when it creates overenforcement problems, facilitating 
excessive duplicative enforcement actions. 
There is a fair amount of finger-pointing when it comes to 
enforcement piggybacking. The most common target of such 
finger-pointing tends to be private enforcers.139 Private enforcers 
have been accused of riding on the coattails of public enforcers that 
have invested considerable resources in investigation and 
litigation.140 Private enforcers are particularly incentivized to 
piggyback because they are financially motivated and seek to 
leverage the smallest investment of resources for the greatest 
recoveries or attorneys’ fees. 
But private enforcers are not the only ones accused of 
piggybacking. State enforcement actions brought by AGs have also 
been criticized for duplicating private class action litigation.141 In 
particular AGs have the authority to bring parens patriae actions 
that closely resemble private class actions.142 In fact, AGs can bring 
parens patriae actions against the same corporation as a class action 
and even hire the same class counsel to pursue the action  on behalf 
of the state and its residents.143  
AGs have also been criticized for piggybacking on federal 
enforcement actions, particularly in the areas of antitrust and 
 
 137. See James J. Park, Rules, Principles, and the Competition to Enforce the Securities Laws, 
100 CAL. L. REV. 115, 120 (2012) (describing the problem of overenforcement); Rose, 
Contextual Approach, supra note 10, at 1354 (arguing that multiple enforcers incentivize some 
enforcers to free ride on the work of others). 
 138. See Rubenstein, supra note 22, at 2151. 
 139. See Coffee, Bounty Hunter, supra note 21, at 221–25. (describing private litigants  
as free-riders when they piggyback on public enforcers to reap the gain from their 
investigative work). 
 140. See id. at 234. 
 141. See Posner, supra note 16, at 9–10. 
 142. See supra note 26. 
 143. See Lemos, Privatizing Public Litigation, supra note 27, at 582; Pryor, supra note 26; 
Dishman, supra note 26. 
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securities enforcement.144 In the context of securities enforcement, 
rational states may do little to enforce securities fraud against 
public corporations, and instead piggyback on federal securities 
enforcement.145 AGs may be incentivized to piggyback on federal 
and private enforcers because their offices have limited budgets 
and, like private enforcers, they want to leverage the least amount 
of enforcement resources for the greatest possible settlement to 
benefit their states, or their own political benefit.146 
Although less common, federal enforcers can also piggyback on 
AG actions and on private enforcement actions. Federal enforcers 
may piggyback because they may have come late to certain 
enforcement actions due to agency capture, bureaucratic 
sluggishness, or other political impediments.147 
Piggybacking, however, can be characterized in a more 
flattering light. It creates efficiencies by not duplicating 
enforcement efforts, thus requiring fewer enforcement resources to 
accomplish enforcement objectives. To the extent that multiple 
actions are necessary to compensate and deter, piggybacking can 
be a way to pool and leverage enforcement resources. But, of 
course, the problem with piggybacking can lie in incentives. 
Piggybacking disincentivizes any enforcers from investing 
resources in enforcement actions if they know that others can 
duplicate their efforts without investing the same resources.148 This 
piggybacking ironically leads to underenforcement because no 
enforcer may be incentivized to invest resources in any 
investigation or enforcement actions.149 
Piggybacking actions are collateral consequences that affect 
how corporations respond to enforcement actions and in particular, 
the decisions to settle.150  Corporate enforcement targets will always 
consider enforcement holistically, considering the aggregate 
 
 144. See Posner, Federalism and Antitrust, supra note 16, at 9–10. 
 145. See Rose, Contextual Approach, supra note 10, at 1387 (showing empirical support 
for the proposition that states free ride on federal enforcers and other states in securities 
enforcement against public companies). 
 146. See Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 26, at 524–25 (discussing the impact of 
resource constraints in AG offices); Posner, Federalism and Antitrust, supra note 16, at 9 
(stating attorneys general offices are chronically underfunded). 
 147. See Totten, The Enforcers, supra note 10, at 1664. 
 148. Rose, Contextual Approach, supra note 10, at 1369. 
 149. Id. 
 150. See Minzner, supra note 35, at 2146. 
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consequences of the current action and any potential piggybacking 
actions.151 But enforcers can only control the direct consequences of 
their own enforcement actions. It is common that the future 
collateral consequences, especially from private actions, will be far 
greater than the immediate penalty.152 As a result, corporate targets 
will litigate more intensely or refuse to settle out of concern about 
the consequences of piggybacking actions. This makes enforcement 
more expensive and drag out longer. The concern for the collateral 
consequences from piggybacking actions has led to public 
enforcers, such as the SEC, to enter into settlements that do not 
require the defendant to admit or deny liability.153 “No admit or 
deny” settlements deprive piggybacking private enforcers from 
relying on admissions to establish liability in subsequent private 
actions.154  But such settlements come at the cost of the public’s right 
to know the truth.155  
Enforcement piggybacking has been criticized for creating 
overenforcement. This criticism has focused on piggybacking 
between public and private enforcers,156 and federal and state 
enforcers.157 But states also piggyback on one another in 
enforcement actions. State enforcement piggybacking has similar 
consequences as other types of enforcement piggybacking, 
including the potential for overenforcement.   
II. STATE ENFORCEMENT PIGGYBACKING 
Multistate actions by AGs are an increasing enforcement trend. 
Targets of multistate actions are often major national and 
multinational corporations. Settlements in multistate actions can 
 
 151. See id. 
 152. See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 31 at 157–58 & n.204 (“The SEC, FTC, and DOJ 
all know that the real financial wallop, in most instances, will come from the private class 
actions that follow their investigation.”). 
 153. See generally Samuel W. Buell, Liability and Admissions of Wrong-Doing in Public 
Enforcement of the Law, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 505 (2013); Lynndon Groff, Is Too Big to Fail Too Big 
to Confess? Scrutinizing the SEC’s “No-Admit” Consent Judgment Proposals, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1727 
(2013); Verity Winship & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Admission of Guilt in Civil Enforcement, 102 
MINN. L. REV. 1077 (2018). 
 154. See SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2011) 
vacated, 752 F.3d 285 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 155. See id. 
 156. See Coffee, Bounty Hunter, supra note 21, at 215. 
 157. See Pryor, supra note 26, at 1901–03. 
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reach the multimillion, or even billion-dollar range.158 The 
multistate action allows many states to piggyback on the 
investment of resources and leadership made by a few AGs. This 
piggybacking is similar to what happens more broadly in the 
multienforcer system. This means that multistate actions may also 
serve to exacerbate the problem of unfair and unnecessary 
duplicative litigation that occurs in a multienforcer system. 
A. The Rise of AGs and Multistate Actions 
The office of the AG has recently risen in prominence from a 
relatively unknown state actor to a national policymaker and feared 
enforcer.159 Part of the rise in importance of the AG has been the 
concurrent rise of the multistate action. AGs may use their power 
to litigate to bring high-profile parens patriae actions against large 
corporations.160 Parens patriae actions allow AGs to bring actions 
not only on behalf of the state but also on behalf of state residents 
for their “health and well-being—both physical and economic.”161 
AGs’ powers to bring actions on behalf of their residents has 
allowed them to bring actions against large corporations, closely 
resembling private class actions.162 For example, AGs have brought 
mass product liability lawsuits with their parens patriae powers 
 
 158. Paul Nolette, State Attorneys General Are More and More Powerful. Is That a Problem?, 
WASH. POST (Mar. 5, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/ 
2015/03/05/state-attorneys-general-are-more-and-more-powerful-is-that-a-problem/? 
utm_term=.f141b41e8f61 (“AG-led lawsuits have become a crucial part of the American 
regulatory landscape, particularly since their resolution often involves millions (even 
billions) in fines and new regulatory requirements for the targeted industries.”). 
 159. See NOLETTE, supra note 29, at 1 (“Before a personal scandal that precipitated his 
dramatic fall, Eliot Spitzer was one of corporate America’s most feared regulators.”). 
 160. See Edward Brunet, Improving Class Action Efficiency by Expanded Use of Parens 
Patriae Suits and Intervention, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1919, 1921–22 (2000) (“Because of the perceived 
successful settlement of state parens patriae tobacco cases, states have brought parens patriae 
suits against entire industries, including guns, lead paint, and more recently, health 
maintenance organizations . . . [T]here now exists a blueprint for states to consider filing 
class-like lawsuits for injuries to their citizens’ health and overall economic well-being.” 
(emphasis and footnotes omitted)). 
 161. Alfred L. Snapp & Sons, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982); see also Jack 
Ratliff, Parens Patriae: An Overview, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1847, 1850–51 (2000). 
 162. See Brunet, supra note 160, at 1921–22; Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 26, at 
494–95, 502; Dishman, supra note 26. 
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against manufacturers of tobacco products, lead paint, 
automobiles, and guns.163 
While AGs have the authority to bring parens patriae actions 
alone, they are increasingly combining forces to bring multistate 
actions together.164 Combining forces in multistate actions has 
allowed AGs to bring corporations to the negotiating table in a big 
way.165 The multistate tobacco action triggered a proliferation of 
multistate actions that began the rise of the AG and multistate 
action.166 During and in the wake of the Great Recession, there were 
a series of multistate actions brought against Wall Street banks,167 
rating agencies,168 and mortgage servicers.169 High-profile data 
breaches have also been the subject of multistate actions, resulting 
 
 163. See Brunet, supra note 160, at 1921–22; Donald G. Gifford, Impersonating the 
Legislature: State Attorneys General and Parens Patriae Product Litigation, 49 B.C. L. REV. 913, 
914–16 (2008). 
 164. See NOLETTE, supra note 29; Ann O’M. Bowman, Horizontal Federalism: Exploring 
Interstate Interactions, 14 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 535, 541 (2004) (“This form of 
interstate cooperation appears to have become more popular over time, with the number 
of . . . lawsuits increasing during the decade.”); Lynch, supra note 82, at 2004 (“Over the past 
two decades, multistate litigation has grown to become a powerful and commonly used law 
enforcement tool.”). 
 165. See David J. Morrow, Transporting Lawsuits Across State Borders, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
9, 1997), https://www.nytimes.com/1995/11/26/business/spending-it-finding-the-value-
behind-the-clutter.html (“What we’ve found is that by coming together, the dynamics of the 
cases change . . . . When a corporation discovered it had to face 30 states, instead of one, it 
suddenly became much more serious about dealing with the issue.”). 
 166. The Master Settlement Agreement is the largest civil settlement in American 
history. The settlement occurred in 1998, with 46 states participating, and settled for over 
$200 billion to be paid to the states over twenty-five years by the four largest U.S. tobacco 
companies. Richard P. Ieyoub & Theodore Eisenberg, State Attorney General Actions, the 
Tobacco Litigation, and the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1859, 1859 (2000); see also 
Lynch, supra note 82, at 2006. 
 167. See generally, Totten, The Enforcers, supra note 10. 
 168. See, e.g., Office of Attorney Gen. George Jepsen, Attorney General Jepsen Leads 
Multistate Coalition in $1.375 Billion State-Federal Settlement with Standard & Poor’s,  
CT.GOV (Feb. 3, 2015), https://portal.ct.gov/AG/Press-Releases-Archived/2015-Press-
Releases/Attorney-General-Jepsen-Leads-Multistate-Coalition-in-1375-Billion-State 
Federal-Settlement-with-Stan [hereinafter Conn. S&P Press Release]; California Attorney 
General’s Office Announces $150 Million Settlement with Financial Services Company Moody’s for 
Inflating Mortgage-Backed Securities Ratings, ST. CAL. DEP’T JUST. (Jan. 13, 2017), https://oag. 
ca.gov/news/press-releases/california-attorney-generals-office-announces-150-million-
settlement-financial. 
 169. See, e.g., Federal Government and State Attorneys General Reach $25 Billion Agreement 
with Five Largest Mortgage Servicers to Address Mortgage Loan Servicing and Foreclosure Abuses, 
U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Feb. 9, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-government-and-
state-attorneys-general-reach-25-billion-agreement-five-largest [hereinafter DOJ National 
Mortgage Settlement Press Release]. 
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in settlements with Neiman Marcus,170 Nationwide Insurance,171 
Target,172 and a pending investigation of Equifax.173 The opioid 
epidemic has also sparked a multistate investigation of the 
pharmaceutical industry.174 
Multistate settlements are some of the largest in American 
history. The Master Settlement Agreement with forty-six states and 
several tobacco companies settled for over $200 billion, the largest 
settlement in American history.175 The National Mortgage 
Settlement with forty-nine states and the largest mortgage servicers 
settled for $25 billion.176 A joint multistate and federal coordinated 
working group entered into a series of multibillion dollar 
settlements with Bank of America, JPMorgan, and others for their 
role in securitizing Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS) 
leading up to the financial crisis. 177 Federal enforcers, nineteen 
 
 170. See Office of Attorney Gen. Maura Healy, AG Healy Joins $1.5 Million Multistate 
Settlement with Neiman Marcus Over 2013 Data Breach, MASS.GOV (Jan. 8, 2019), 
https://www.mass.gov/news/ag-healey-joins-15-million-multistate-settlement-with-
neiman-marcus-over-2013-data-breach. 
 171. See Kevin McCoy, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Agrees to $5.5M Settlement Over  
Data Breach, USA TODAY (Aug. 9, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2017 
/08/09/nationwide-mutual-insurance-agrees-5-5-m-settlement-over-data-
breach/552687001/; A.G. Schneiderman Announces $5.5 Million Multi-State Settlement with 
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company over 2012 Data Breach, N.Y. ST. OFF. ATT’Y GEN. (Aug. 
9, 2017), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-announces-55-million-multi-
state-settlement-nationwide-mutual. 
 172. See Rachel Abrams, Target to Pay $18.5 Million to 47 States in Security Breach 
Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2017) https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/23/business/ 
target-security-breach-settlement.html; Attorney General Becerra: Target Settles Record $18.5 
Million Credit Card Data Breach Case, ST. CAL. DEP’T JUST. (May 23, 2017), 
https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-becerra-target-settles-record-
185-million-credit-card-data [hereinafter Cal. Target Press Release]. 
 173. See Reuters, Nearly 40 States Are Probing Equifax’s Data Breach, FORTUNE  
(Sept. 13, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/09/13/equifax-data-breach-investigation/. For a 
discussion of AGs in the area of privacy enforcement, see Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy 
Policymaking of State Attorneys General, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747, 750 (2016) (“State 
attorneys general have been nimble privacy enforcement pioneers[.]”). 
 174. See Nadia Kounang, 41 State Attorneys General Subpoena Opioid Manufacturers, CNN 
(Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/19/health/state-ag-investigation-opioids-
subpoenas/index.html; see also Nolette & Provost, supra note 29. 
 175. Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 166, at 1859. 
 176. See DOJ National Mortgage Settlement Press Release, supra note 169. 
 177. See Bank of America to Pay $16.65 Billion in Historic Justice Department Settlement for 
Financial Fraud Leading up to and During the Financial Crisis, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Aug. 21, 2014), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bank-america-pay-1665-billion-historic-justice-
department-settlement-financial-fraud-leading [hereinafter Bank of America Press Release]; 
Justice Department and State Partners Secure Record $13 Billion Global Settlement with JPMorgan 
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states and Standard & Poor’s (S&P) settled for $1.375 billion for 
S&P’s ratings of toxic investments during the financial crisis.178 
Multistate settlements not only command high-dollar 
settlements but also have the ability to make sweeping reforms to 
entire industries.179 For example, the National Mortgage Settlement 
and its progeny changed the way mortgages are serviced and 
foreclosed.180 The Master Settlement Agreement changed how 
tobacco companies could advertise.181 Multistate settlements have 
implemented these reforms, even in the face of historic opposition 
of the same type of regulations in the legislature.182 This regulatory 
ability puts tremendous power in the hands of AGs that has 
traditionally been vested in legislatures and executive agencies—
leading some scholars to raise concerns about AGs regulating 
through settlements.183 
The rise of the AGs and multistate actions go hand in hand;  
as AGs have become powerful, they have been able to combine 
forces in multistate actions, and, as multistate actions have  
become more successful, AGs have increased their power and 
national prominence. 
B. Piggybacking in Multistate Actions 
Multistate actions provide a means for states to more 
economically pursue enforcement actions against large 
corporations. For instance, an AG pursuing a case alone against a 
major corporation would have to commit all or significant portions 
of her enforcement resources on a single enforcement action.184 But 
if many states could piggyback on the investment of resources from 
 
for Misleading Investors About Securities Containing Toxic Mortgages, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Nov.  
19, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-federal-and-state-partners-
secure-record-13-billion-global-settlement [hereinafter JPMorgan Press Release]. 
 178. See Conn. S&P Press Release, supra note 168. 
 179. See Matthew C. Turk, Regulation by Settlement, 66 U. KAN. L. REV. 259, 260 (2017); 
Lynch, supra note 82, at 2009 (“Where before the influence of attorneys general stopped at 
the borders of their states, today groups of attorneys general can affect the behavior of 
corporations nationally.”); see also Gifford, supra note 163, at 914. 
 180. See DOJ National Mortgage Settlement Press Release, supra note 169. 
 181. See Master Settlement Agreement 10–26 (1998), http://www.naag.org/assets/ 
redesign/files/msa-tobacco/MSA.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2019); see also Gifford, supra note 
163, at 914. 
 182. See Gifford, supra note 163, at 914. 
 183. See id.; Turk, supra note 179, at 260. 
 184. See Lynch, supra note 82, at 2005. 
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a single or few states, they could benefit from a multistate 
settlement without devoting the same amount of resources. 
Piggybacking among states occurs when states join or replicate 
an enforcement action initially brought or led by another state, 
without contributing the same amount of resources to investigate, 
litigate, or settle the action. States can replicate other states’ 
enforcement actions by bringing the same action alone or they can 
join, but not meaningfully contribute, to a multistate action.  This 
Article focuses on piggybacking in the context of multistate actions. 
By bringing multistate actions together, states can more 
efficiently leverage limited state enforcement resources.185 Because 
multistate actions are based on a collective group of states asserting 
the same or similar legal theories and discovery, corporate 
defendants are faced with what amounts to a single large lawsuit 
and are forced to engage and negotiate with the participating states 
as a group.186 Multistate actions thus allow states to invest fewer 
enforcement resources and demand bigger settlements at the  
same time. 
Piggybacking in multistate actions is a distinct form of 
enforcement piggybacking, whereby states can piggyback on other 
states’ enforcement actions in a coordinated manner. Multistate 
actions can take different forms depending on whether AGs are 
pursuing a multistate action under state or federal law. Multistate 
actions arising under state law actually consist of multiple cases, 
which are “mirror images” of complaints filed in state courts of all 
participating states.187 States may also file a multistate action  
either in federal court, based on their ability to enforce federal law, 
or in enforcement actions coordinated with federal enforcers.  
In both instances, the states are joint plaintiffs in signing the  
same complaint.188 
Whether arising under state or federal law, multistate actions 
produce opportunities for states to piggyback off one another. In a 
typical multistate action, many states may participate, but only a 
 
 185. See Lemos, Aggregate Action, supra note 26, at 524–25 (noting attorneys general have 
limited budgets and small staffs, but can achieve some economies of scale by banding 
together in multistate actions); Totten, The Enforcers, supra note 10, at 1664–66 (noting, absent 
collaboration, states could not have played a critical role in Great Recession enforcement). 
 186. See Lynch, supra note 82, at 2005–06. 
 187. Id. at 2007. 
 188. See id. 
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few states lead the action.189 Multistate actions often begin as one 
AG, or a small group of AGs, doing much of the early investigative 
work.190 “[T]he states initiating the action will often propose  
a multistate working group and offer to chair or co-chair  
the group.”191 
Certain states most often lead multistate actions.192 In fact, the 
New York AG is the state AG that most commonly leads multistate 
actions and has led multistate actions at twice the rate of the next 
most active state.193 Other states have played an important leading 
role in recent multistate litigation against corporations. For 
example, Illinois and Connecticut led a multistate action of eighteen 
states against Target Corporation for a data breach.194 Multistate 
actions may also be led by a small group of states that form an 
executive committee of AGs. For example, the National Mortgage 
Settlement was led by an executive committee of AGs.195 
These leading AGs play an important coordinating role, 
performing litigation tasks such as organizing document 
 
 189. See NOLETTE, supra note 29, at 26; Bowman, supra note 164, at 540–41 (“A core 
group of eleven states, many of them large states, appears to have played leadership roles, 
given their high level of involvement.”); Cox, Widman & Totten, supra note 125, at 85 
(describing a “heavies” group of states that lead multistate actions); Lynch, supra note 82, at 
2004 (“Usually, the [AG] offices are so closely coordinated that those participating in the case 
will choose one or two lead states and cede to them primary responsibility for negotiating 
with the defendant on behalf of all the states involved.”). 
 190. See Provost, An Integrated Model, supra note 32, at 3. 
 191. NOLETTE, supra note 29, at 26. “The National Association for Attorneys General 
[NAAG] facilitates interaction among [AGs]” and coordinates federal-state working group 
and multistate actions, in particular, multistate antitrust actions. What is the National 
Association of Attorneys General (NAAG)?, NAAG, https://www.naag.org/naag/ 
about_naag/faq/what_is_the_national_association_of_attorneys_general_naag.php (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2019). NAAG also promulgated antitrust and consumer protection 
enforcement guidelines that helped formalize cooperation among AGs. See Lynch, supra note 
82, at 2004. 
 192. See NOLETTE, supra note 29, at 27. Nolette identified the leading states in multistate 
actions and listed the top ten states that were the most frequent leaders of multistate actions. 
The top ten states for leading multistate actions are New York, California, Massachusetts, 
Texas, Florida, Illinois, Ohio, Connecticut, Oregon, and Washington. Id. 
 193. See id. at 26. 
 194. See Attorney General Madigan Announces $18.5 Million Settlement with Target over 
Data Breach, ILL. ATT’Y GEN. (May 23, 2017), http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/ 
pressroom/2017_05/20170523b.html. 
 195. See Consent Judgment, Exhibit B at B-5, U.S. v. Bank of America Corp., No. 12-0361 
(D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2012) [hereinafter Consent Judgment]. For example, the states that served on 
the National Mortgage Settlement Executive Committee were Iowa, Arizona, California, 
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Tennessee, Texas, and Washington. See Consent Judgment, supra. 
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reviews.196 That same small group of AGs generally files the first 
lawsuits and then negotiates the settlement through executive or 
negotiating committees.197 Typically, the leading AGs will send out 
settlement information to the other states, including states not 
currently part of the action, to determine whether they want to join 
a proposed settlement.198 AGs that lead settlement negotiations 
play the most important role bringing the action to settlement.199 
Participating states contribute in varying degrees to multistate 
actions but contribute significantly fewer resources than leading 
states.200 In essence, multistate litigation is organized as a pyramid 
with a few leading AGs at the top and other AGs contributing to 
lesser degrees at lower levels of the pyramid. Once a lawsuit is 
initially filed after investigation, other states may file lawsuits in 
their own states and help with the remainder of the work to be 
done.201 Participating states may have staff involved in a working 
group that meets regularly by conference call to discuss strategy 
and share information developed through each state’s 
investigation.202 Some participating states share staff and the costs 
incurred during the litigation, as well as sharing of discovery, 
pleadings, and legal memoranda. This collaboration makes 
multistate action more efficient by preventing redundant efforts 
among participating states and “creat[es], in effect, a temporary law 
firm dedicated to a single case that has more resources available to 
it than any individual office could commit to the matter alone.”203 
However, several other states completely piggyback in 
multistate actions. Leading AGs often attempt to recruit other states 
to join multistate actions.204 Only states that sign the settlement get 
a portion of the settlement amount.205 When a settlement will occur 
regardless of whether or not a particular AG participates, AGs may 
 
 196. See NOLETTE, supra note 29, at 26. 
 197. See id. 
 198. See id. 
 199. Id.; see also Cox, Widman & Totten, supra note 125, at 84 (explaining that enforcers 
who serve on executive or monitoring committees are leaders who bring the case to close). 
 200. NOLETTE, supra note 29, at 26. 
 201. See Provost, An Integrated Model, supra note 32, at 3–4. 
 202. See Lynch, supra note 82, at 2008. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. See Cox, Widman & Totten, supra note 125, at 84. 
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join the settlement to get a share of the settlement proceeds.206 These 
states may contribute nothing more than a signature on the 
settlement agreement that the leading states have already 
negotiated.207 If an AG is only required to invest minimal resources 
in joining a multistate action and can leverage that small 
investment into a large financial settlement, an AG will often be 
incentivized to piggyback in multistate actions. 
Corporations are also incentivized to settle multistate actions in 
a way that encourages piggybacking. Rather than protract the 
investigation and litigation, corporations will often seek to settle 
the action quickly, which makes the upfront investment in 
investigation and early litigation important.208 Because 
corporations often desire to settle expeditiously, states piggyback 
off the investigation and early litigation of leading AGs by joining 
a multistate action and expect a quick settlement with a corporation 
rather than protracted litigation. Further, since corporations may 
want to have the finality of settlement with all the states at the same 
time, corporations may request that all or most states be included 
in the settlement to avoid future litigation. A corporation’s desire 
to settle quickly with finality contributes to piggybacking by 
allowing some states to simply sign the final settlement with little 
to no contribution of resources to the underlying enforcement 
action and still gain large monetary settlements. 
State enforcement piggybacking is unique because states cannot 
preempt other states’ actions, nor are they required to coordinate 
with one another when enforcing their own state law.209 These 
attributes may result in states piggybacking on each other more 
than on other enforcers. Further, states, like private enforcers, may 
be particularly inclined to engage in piggybacking, both on one 
another and other enforcers, due to their limited resources.210 As a 
 
 206. Id. 
 207. See NOLETTE, supra note 29, at 26–27 (“Many states participate in multistate 
litigation, but only a few states typically take a leading role in these efforts.”); Cox, Widman 
& Totten, supra note 125, at 84 (“Participants may lend nothing more than a signature to a 
settlement agreement . . . .”). 
 208. See Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 26, at 522–24. 
 209. See Rose, Multienforcer Approach, supra note 7, at 2175. 
 210. See Lynch, supra note 82, at 2003–04 (“Faced with the daunting prospect of 
prosecuting large, wealthy, and well lawyered corporations—defendants that often have 
many times the financial and legal personnel resources of even a large attorney general’s 
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result, states may look to other states and other enforcers to make 
the investment of resources necessary to pursue enforcement 
actions against corporations. 
C. Multistate Actions in a Multienforcer System 
Piggybacking in multistate actions resembles the piggybacking 
that occurs among other enforcers in the broader multienforcer 
system. Just as other enforcers piggyback on one another, states 
also piggyback on each other in multistate actions. Prior to the rise 
of multistate actions, state enforcement had built-in safeguards that 
reduced the risk of overenforcement.211 The safeguard was limited 
resources.212 Limited resources forced AGs to make careful 
decisions about enforcement actions and largely limited the  
ability of AGs to bring enforcement actions against major 
corporations.213 The multistate action has in part overcome the 
limited resources problem. And now, the safeguard of limited 
resources that once prevented overenforcement in state 
enforcement has given way to a system where state enforcement is 
more prone to overenforcement. 
Piggybacking in multistate actions allows states with limited 
resources but strong claims to bring action where they may not 
have the resources to bring action alone. However, multistate 
actions also allow states with weak claims to piggyback on other 
states’ stronger legal claims.214 Because multistate actions are 
usually settled, it is rare that each state’s claim and legal theory is 
meaningfully tested in litigation.215 Like class actions, weaker 
claims in a multistate action can piggyback on stronger claims.216 
This means multistate actions run the risk of overenforcement 
because they allow states to duplicate actions without necessarily 
having a strong legal basis. 
 
office—for violations of state law, state attorneys general began to reach across state lines  
for help.”). 
 211. See Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, supra note 51, at 703. 
 212. See id. 
 213. See Lynch, supra note 82, at 2005. 
 214. See Dishman, supra note 26. 
 215. See Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, supra note 26, at 491; Dishman, supra 
note 26. 
 216. See Brunet, supra note 160, at 1937 (describing the common pool problem in  
class actions). 
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The piggybacking in multistate actions is not just a microcosm 
of what is occurring in the broader multienforcer system. Multistate 
actions change the dynamics in the multienforcer system, 
providing another species of action that can piggyback on other 
enforcers. Multistate actions can intensify piggybacking when 
entire multistate actions are the result of a few leading AGs 
piggybacking on the actions of another enforcer. When leading 
AGs piggyback on another enforcer and then organize as a 
multistate action, the piggybacking in the system amplifies 
dramatically. Instead of a few states piggybacking on a federal 
action, multistate actions facilitate potentially every state in the 
country piggybacking on a federal enforcement action. For 
example, multistate antitrust enforcement actions can be the result 
of state piggybacking on federal antitrust enforcement.217 While 
piggybacking on federal enforcement actions may be necessary for 
states to remedy inadequate federal enforcement actions, there is a 
significant risk that piggybacking on federal actions is simply piling 
on to the federal actions, extracting additional penalties from an 
easy target that has already been tackled. 
In addition to federal enforcers, multistate actions can 
piggyback on private class actions. AGs have the ability to bring 
parens patriae actions that closely resemble private class actions.  
AGs may even hire private counsel to represent the state and its 
residents in a parens patriae action on a contingency fee 
arrangement.218 While these public-private hybrids occur on the 
individual state level, it is possible that they could also occur on the 
multistate level with many states agreeing to hire private class 
counsel to represent the interests of many states in a multistate 
action. Multistate actions that piggyback on private class actions 
may be necessary in light of the agency costs that arise in class 
actions. However, they may also be unnecessarily duplicative, 
especially when they may be seeking compensation for those who 
already recovered in private actions.219 
When the genesis of an entire multistate action is piggybacking 
off another enforcer, it creates an enforcement echo chamber where 
 
 217. See Pryor, supra note 26, at 1907. 
 218. See Lemos, Privatizing Public Litigation, supra note 27, at 582. 
 219. See Cox, supra note 132, at 2370; Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 26, at 531 
(discussing preclusion of state actions following private action). 
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a single action can be duplicated many times over as states 
piggyback on one another. While it is possible that this type of 
piggybacking is filling an enforcement void, it is less likely that 
multistate actions are remedying underenforcement when they 
come on the heels of multiple federal and private actions. Rather, 
there is a risk of multistate actions creating unfair and unnecessary 
duplicative action.220 
Multistate actions may also prompt other enforcers to 
piggyback on them. Multistate actions against major corporations 
are high profile and often command large settlements. They draw 
the attention of other federal and private enforcers in a way that an 
AG bringing an action alone may not. When multistate actions 
attract the attention of federal enforcers that then piggyback on 
multistate actions, this can mean that multistate actions are 
performing an important function in the multienforcer system. In 
this instance, AGs’ multistate actions have prodded federal 
enforcers to act in areas of important national regulation where 
they have been slow to respond because of agency capture, political 
impediments, or bureaucratic red tape. For example, AGs 
prompted federal action by their enforcement during the Great 
Recession against Wall Street Banks.221 
Multistate actions may also attract the attention of private 
enforcers. Private enforcers are strongly incentivized to  
piggyback on other enforcers to make their actions more 
economical. Private enforcement actions have traditionally been 
focused on compensation, and public enforcement actions have 
primarily focused on deterrence.222 A current trend in public 
enforcement, including multistate actions, is to increasingly 
provide public compensation as part of the settlements.223 When 
private enforcers piggyback on multistate actions, they may be 
seeking compensation for the same people who received public 
compensation in the multistate action.224 This overlap may be 
 
 220. See Rosenstein Remarks, supra note 9. 
 221. See Totten, The Enforcers, supra note 10, at 1664. 
 222. See Lemos, Privatizing Public Enforcement, supra note 27, at 525. 
 223. See Cox, supra note 127, at 2352 (noting the current trend of public compensation 
for federal agencies and state AGs). 
 224. For a discussion about the reasons that public actions may not fully compensate 
injured people, see Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 26, at 535–38; Dishman, supra  
note 26. 
002.DISHMAN_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/14/20  1:53 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2019 
458 
 
necessary because the public compensation in AG actions may not 
be adequate to fully compensate injuries.225 However, there may be 
an unfair second bite of the apple in terms of compensation when 
private enforcers piggyback on multistate actions that have 
provided public compensation.226  
The multienforcer system is more prone to overenforcement 
when all of the enforcers are attracted to the same target. The 
targets of multistate actions tend to be large corporations that 
operate nationally because many states may be injured by major 
corporate fraud and there is jurisdiction in multiple states. Large 
corporations also tend to have enough resources to pay large 
settlements to many states. AGs may be attracted to large  
corporate targets because going after a large public company  
can garner media attention that may bolster an AG’s future election 
prospects.227 However, the large corporations that are often 
targeted by multistate actions also happen to be the same type of 
targets that federal and private enforcers are attracted to in  
their enforcement actions. Federal enforcers are attracted to 
enforcement actions against large corporations because they are 
concerned with actions of national scope and importance. Large 
corporations are also prime targets of private enforcers because 
they have deep enough pockets to pay large recoveries for 
plaintiffs, or at least large attorneys’ fees. When all the enforcers in 
a multienforcer system are attracted to the same type of target, 
piggybacking is even more appealing and the potential for  
overenforcement increases. 
But what are the problems with over-enforcing against large 
corporations, particularly when their misconduct makes them 
unsympathetic “victims”? First, a fundamental principle of fairness 
requires that corporations should only be punished for their 
wrongdoings in an amount equal to what is necessary to 
compensate injuries and deter future misconduct.228 Excessive 
enforcement is not only unfair to the corporate entity but also to 
 
 225. Dishman, supra note 26. 
 226. See Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 26, at 500. 
 227. See Burch, supra note 96, at 1924; Provost, An Integrated Model, supra note 32, at 2–
3; Rose, Contextual Approach, supra note 10, at 1408. 
 228. See Rosenstein Remarks, supra note 9 (“We need to consider the impact on innocent 
employees, customers, and investors who seek to resolve problems and move on.”). 
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corporate stakeholders who often foot the bill of enforcement 
settlements, such as shareholders and employees.229 
Second, overenforcement also creates a drag on the economy by 
overdeterring corporations and injecting uncertainty into 
settlements.230 Overdeterrence causes corporations to take 
suboptimal risk or overinvest in self-monitoring. Ironically, 
overdeterrence creates some of the same social costs as corporate 
fraud, namely, “it can increase the cost of capital . . . and upset the 
allocative efficiency of the economy[.]”231 The potential for 
duplicative actions also removes certainty from the settlement 
process and makes it harder for corporations to predict the universe 
of total liability that will arise from a particular event.232 Piling on 
can deprive a company of the benefits of certainty and finality 
ordinarily available through a full and final settlement.233 
Corporations may have to hold litigation reserves for duplicative 
action that could be employed more effectively. While settlement  
is generally more economical for both enforcers and corporations, 
corporations may be less willing to settle if they cannot predict 
future liability. This uncertainty results in enforcers investing  
more resources to get corporations to agree to settlement, or 
lowering their settlement demands in order to make settlement 
more attractive.  
Third, overenforcement is not only a drag on the economy, it 
also leads to inefficient uses of enforcement resources. The idea of 
a multienforcer system is to spread enforcement resources, 
allowing each enforcer to use its comparative enforcement 
advantages to broaden the reach of enforcement and also act as a 
check on other enforcers.234 But if all enforcement resources are 
concentrated on the same type of actions against the same type of 
targets, it undermines the benefits of having a multienforcer system 
in the first place. If piggybacking has undermined the multienforcer 
system, then it would be more efficient and yield more optimal 
 
 229. Id.; see also SEC v. Bank of America Corp., Nos. 09 Civ. 6829(JSR), 10 Civ. 0215(JSR), 
2010 WL 624581, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010). 
 230. See Rose, Multienforcer Approach, supra note 7, at 2176. 
 231. Id. at 2184. 
 232. See Rosenstein Remarks, supra note 9. 
 233. Id. 
 234. See Calkins, supra note 90, at 679–80; Rose, Contextual Approach, supra note 10,  
at 1402. 
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enforcement levels to have a single enforcer system.235 
Furthermore, if all enforcers are focused on a single type of action, 
they may disrupt each other’s enforcement goals.236 For example, 
federal enforcers may be seeking a settlement that prioritizes 
injunctive relief and corporate governance in lieu of greater 
financial penalties. But if a multistate group or private enforcement 
action is seeking a higher financial settlement or different injunctive 
remedies, it could jeopardize the federal enforcers’ settlement. 
Fourth, piggybacking and overenforcement against certain 
targets lead to underenforcement of other targets.237 If all enforcers 
are incentivized to piggyback on the same targets, then other types 
of cases may be neglected in the process. Enforcement 
piggybacking devotes additional resources on fraud that has 
already been uncovered at the expense of investigating fraud that 
has not been exposed.238 For example, enforcers may piggyback on 
more marginal investigations that are in the public’s eye at the 
expense  of pursuing more egregious fraud.239  State enforcement is 
unique in that one of its advantages is its ability to target local and 
state-specific enforcement needs.240 If AGs are increasingly focused 
on multistate actions, it may be that more local enforcement is 
neglected or under-resourced. This could lead to a situation where 
state enforcement does not deter small-scale fraudsters who think 
that the AG’s office is solely focused on large national corporations. 
This could ironically lead to greater levels of local fraud, which is 
the very reason to have state enforcement in the first place. 
Piggybacking in multistate actions may also lead to 
underenforcement because leading states may be disincentivized 
from leading multistate actions if other states can piggyback on the 
 
 235. See Rose, Multienforcer Approach, supra note 7, at 2176. 
 236. See Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, supra note 50, at 719 (“But federal 
enforcers cannot prevent the states from acting in ways that conflict with the federal 
enforcement strategy.”). 
 237. See Rose, Contextual Approach, supra note 10, at 1364 (noting the risk of both 
underenforcement and overenforcement at the state level). 
 238. See Rosenstein Remarks, supra note 9. 
 239. See Stephen J. Choi et al., Scandal Enforcement at the SEC: The Arc of the Option 
Backdating Investigations, 15 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 542, 546–47 (2013) (finding empirical 
support for the hypothesis that the SEC pursued more marginal investigations into options 
backdating as the media frenzy surrounding that scandal persisted, at the expense of pursing 
other more egregious securities law violations). 
 240. See Calkins, supra note 90, at 679–80; Totten, The Enforcers, supra note 10,  
at 1653–57. 
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action.241 A reason that private enforcers in class actions often 
piggyback is that the “search costs” or investigation into a potential 
action is resource intensive. These search costs mean that no private 
enforcer is willing to invest too much in investigation when there 
is uncertainty about who will be named class counsel and be “paid” 
for their search costs.242 Similarly, AGs who traditionally have led 
multistate actions may be disincentivized from leading these 
actions because more states are piggybacking on them. Or leading 
AGs may focus on multistate actions that already piggyback on 
federal or private enforcers’ actions in order to reduce their search 
costs, exacerbating the duplicative action problem. 
III. SOLUTIONS FOR STATE ENFORCEMENT PIGGYBACKING 
Different potential solutions have been offered to manage the 
level of enforcement in a multienforcer system, but prior solutions 
do not consider states piggybacking on one another in multistate 
actions. There are procedural protections that exist to prevent 
duplicative private actions. But the solution is more complicated 
when there are several private and public enforcers, including 
multiple states. These solutions may be enforcer-based, 
preemption-based, preclusion-based, or partnership-based. Each 
type of solution has its benefits and drawbacks. That being said, 
partnership-based solutions are most likely to mitigate the 
potential overenforcement problems of multistate actions and the 
broader multienforcer system. 
A. Enforcer-Based Solutions 
Enforcer-based solutions to the piggybacking problem 
generally seek to consolidate the number of enforcers or specialize 
the efforts of enforcers.243 When there are fewer enforcers or only a 
single enforcer, the piggybacking problem is substantially reduced, 
if not extinguished altogether, because there are fewer enforcers or 
no other enforcers to piggyback on. For example, securities 
enforcement could be consolidated to a single public enforcer like 
 
 241. See Rose, Contextual Approach, supra note 7, at 1368. 
 242. See Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 50, at 908. 
 243. See Rose, Multienforcer Approach, supra note 7, at 2176 (advocating a unitary 
enforcer approach instead of a multienforcer approach to securities fraud deterrence). 
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the SEC244 or federal enforcement could be narrowed from multiple 
specialized agencies to a generalist enforcement agency, like the 
Department of Justice.245 
Consolidating the number of enforcers has many benefits. In 
addition to reducing enforcement piggybacking because there are 
fewer enforcers, it is likely to be more efficient and economical. 
Enforcement would be more centralized, coordinated, and 
predictable. Calibrating the level of enforcement would also be 
simpler since it would not require the coordination of multiple 
enforcers to calibrate the level of enforcement. 
However, consolidation of enforcers may have significant 
drawbacks. Fewer enforcers may also be more prone to  
capture by regulated parties.246 Further, consolidating to a single 
enforcer system generally has been proposed to be a single,  
federal public enforcer. It may be costlier and less efficient to rely 
on a single public enforcer because the public must foot the bill for 
all the enforcement instead of relying, in part, on the privately 
funded system.247 
Consolidating to a single, federal enforcer would likely 
extinguish state enforcement altogether. This means that states 
would not piggyback on one another in multistate actions, but it 
would also take away the ability of states to enforce their own state 
laws. This presents a significant federalism problem because it 
deprives states of the meaningful ability to define their own law. 248 
A single, federal enforcer could theoretically enforce individual 
state laws but would not be politically accountable or responsive to 
individual states. 
Another potential enforcer-based solution is to require 
specialization among enforcers to prevent overlap. This would 
mean that enforcers would be required to stay within their area of 
comparative advantage to prevent overlapping actions. A proposal 
in this vein calls for enforcers to specialize in the types of law they 
best enforce, with certain federal enforcers focusing on rules-based 
 
 244. See id. 
 245. See, e.g., Minzner, supra note 35, at 2150–60 (discussing the benefits and costs of 
specialized versus generalist enforcers). 
 246. See Minzner, supra note 34, at 2119. 
 247. See supra note 31. 
 248. See Lemos & Minzner, supra note 72, at 877–78. 
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enforcement and AGs and private enforcers focusing on principle-
based enforcement.249 Another type of specialization solution 
would be to limit federal enforcers to national enforcement and 
AGs to local enforcement. However, while the idea is simple to 
keep multiple enforcers within the sphere of their enforcement 
advantages, in practice, it is difficult to distinguish situations that 
call for rule-based and principle-based enforcement, or national 
and local enforcement. Misconduct by large national corporations 
may have significant local effects and violate state laws. Or a 
corporation predominately doing business in one state may violate 
federal environmental or employment laws. Both of these examples 
could support the case for enforcement that is local or national  
(or both). 
Unlike enforcer consolidation solutions, specialization 
solutions may not address piggybacking in multistate actions. 
Multistate actions could theoretically address local problems that 
exist in many states, but once a multistate action is organized, there 
is an argument that enforcement is national in scope. However, at 
the same time, it may be that the only way a state can economically 
address the situation where a large corporation’s misconduct 
deeply affects states may be through a multistate action. 
B. Preemption-Based Solutions 
Preemption-based solutions are another other potential means 
to mitigate piggybacking problems in a multienforcer system. Like 
enforcer-based solutions, preemption-based solutions seek to 
consolidate the number of enforcers or specialize the enforcers who 
can initiate an enforcement action. 
Preemption may be an avenue to reduce the amount of 
piggybacking vis-a-vis federal and state enforcers. An enforcement 
trend is to delegate enforcement of federal law to the states, in 
particular to AGs.250 Many federal statutes allow states to enforce 
federal law.251 For example, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act authorizes AGs to bring state parens 
patriae actions to enforce federal financial consumer protection 
 
 249. See Park, supra note 137, at 178–81. 
 250. See NOLETTE, supra note 27, at 38–40; Lemos, supra note 51, at 742–43. 
 251. See NOLETTE, supra note 27, at 38–40. 
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law.252 However, federal laws could stop delegating such authority 
to the states or revoke the authority that it has already delegated to 
the states. This could reduce the potential for states to piggyback 
on federal enforcers with respect to enforcing federal law. It could 
also reduce the amount of states piggybacking on each other  
in enforcing federal law because states would be deprived of the 
authority to enforce federal laws. Or federal laws could force  
states to coordinate with federal enforcers to prevent purely 
duplicative actions.253 
In addition, federal law, in some instances, has expressly 
preserved the rights of states to enforce certain state laws that 
overlap with federal enforcement authority. This is the case with 
respect to the enforcement of federal securities laws, where the 
ability of states to enforce securities fraud is expressly protected by 
federal law.254 Instead of expressly preserving state authority in the 
securities area, federal law could preempt state securities fraud 
laws. This preemption would deprive states of the authority to 
piggyback on federal securities fraud actions and consolidate the 
enforcers to federal and private enforcers. This preemption would 
also extinguish piggybacking in multistate actions based on state 
securities fraud statutes. This could be particularly significant in 
light of the fact that New York leads many multistate actions and 
has a powerful state securities fraud statute, on which the AG bases 
many enforcement actions.255 
However, convincing Congress to preempt is a difficult task, 
and preemption is a “blunt instrument” that may lead to 
underenforcement of federal law.256 Federal law has delegated 
enforcement of federal law to state enforcers in order to increase 
enforcement resources and allow states to vacuum-fill potentially 
lackluster federal enforcement.257 State enforcement acts as a check 
 
 252. See Dodd-Frank Act § 1036(a)(l)(B), 12 U.S.C. § 5538 (2012). 
 253. See Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, supra note 51, at 763 (discussing 
requirements of states to notify federal agencies when states enforce federal laws). 
 254. See National Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (NSMIA), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c)(1) 
(2012) (“[A]ny State shall retain jurisdiction under the laws of such State to investigate and 
bring enforcement actions, in connection with securities or securities transactions . . . with 
respect to—fraud or deceit . . . .”) (footnote omitted); see also Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The 
Role of Blue Sky Laws After NSMIA and the JOBS Act, 66 DUKE L.J. 605, 618 (2016). 
 255. See supra note 121. 
 256. See Rose, Contextual Approach, supra note 10, at 1355. 
 257. See id. at 1356–57. 
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on federal enforcement and economically increases enforcement of 
federal law.  
Further, increasing preemption of states enforcing federal law 
does not address the situation where states are enforcing their own 
law. And such restrictions would not address states piggybacking 
in multistate actions, which are often based on state law. Many 
multistate actions are based on state consumer protection laws,  
and preemption of states enforcing federal law would not apply to 
those actions. 
C. Preclusion-Based Solutions 
Preclusion is a potential procedural means to reduce 
enforcement piggybacking. Preclusion rules could prevent 
subsequent enforcement actions, in particular if one enforcer has 
already brought action and received compensation for the same 
group of people. As public enforcers are increasingly seeking 
compensation in their enforcement actions, duplicative public and 
private actions may result in multiple recoveries for the same 
people for the same injuries. Greater preclusion would limit these 
types of duplicative actions.   
With respect to multistate actions, AGs may seek public 
compensation for state residents in parens patriae actions. These 
actions could piggyback on private actions, or private actions could 
piggyback on multistate actions. Preclusion could potentially 
prohibit an AG from bringing an action on behalf of her state 
residents if a class action had already included state residents 
asserting the same type of claims against the same targets. 
Likewise, a multistate action made up of many states’ parens 
patriae actions could potentially preclude a private class action if 
the state residents would be the same as the putative class 
members. In fact, certain state statutes prohibit subsequent  
private action if state residents receive restitution in parens  
patriae actions.258 
 
 258. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 487-12 (2018) (“[T]he consumer’s acceptance and full 
performance of restitution shall bar recovery of any other damages in any action on account 
of the same acts or practices by the consumer against the person or persons making 
restitution.”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-9(B) (2018) (“[A person’s] acceptance of restitution 
bars recovery of any damages in any action by him or on his behalf against the same 
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Greater preclusion would prevent piggybacking between 
private and state enforcers. It would also, in turn, prevent states 
piggybacking off one another in actions replicating private actions 
and also private actions piggybacking on multistate action. It 
would promote fairness by ensuring that a corporation would not 
be paying double recoveries for the same people for the same 
injuries. But it would also create a first-past-the-post system where 
the first enforcer to file may be able to preclude other enforcers, 
leading to potential premature and frivolous lawsuits. 
Scholars have raised concerns about the preclusive effects of 
parens patriae actions on subsequent private action.259 Some courts 
have found that parens patriae actions have preclusive effects 
depending on the type of law at issue260 and the remedy being 
sought.261 There are also instances where the practical effect of a 
parens patriae action can preclude private causes of action and, 
 
defendant on account of the same unlawful practice.”). In contrast, other state statutes 
specifically preserve private rights. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-107(e) (2013) 
(“Assurance of voluntary compliance shall in no way affect individual rights of action which 
may exist independent of the recovery of money or property received pursuant to a 
stipulation in voluntary compliance . . . .”). 
 259. Professor Lemos has argued that even though the case law is “surprisingly sparse, 
the prevailing view is that judgment in a state case is binding ‘on every person whom the 
state represents as parens patriae.’” Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 26, at 500 (quoting 
Susan Beth Farmer, More Lessons from the Laboratories: Cy Pres Distributions in Parens Patriae 
Antitrust Actions Brought by State Attorneys General, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 361, 384 (1999)); see 
also Burch, supra note 96 (“Precluding private suits in the wake of a parens patriae action can 
be particularly problematic since those suits have not been subjected to Rule 23’s adequacy 
requirement and attorneys general may prioritize political agendas and quick resolution 
over private claimants’ interests.”); Davis, supra note 24, at 41 (arguing that state actions 
seeking public compensation that preclude later private claims wrest control from individual 
beneficiaries without providing procedural protections afforded by private actions). 
 260. For example, in the antitrust context, parens patriae actions under certain federal 
antitrust statutes provide preclusive effects for private actions. State courts have also found 
preclusive effects of state antitrust law. See Bonovich v. Convenient Food Mart, Inc., 310 
N.E.2d 710, 711 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (holding unsuccessful parens patriae action by attorney 
general under state antitrust statute precluded private antitrust action against the same 
defendant). That being said, antitrust parens patriae actions often have greater procedural 
requirements than other types of parens patriae actions. See Cox, supra note 127 at 2330–31. 
 261. Courts have also held that parens patriae actions have precluded subsequent 
claims for punitive damages. See, e.g. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Gault, 627 S.E.2d 
549, 553–54 (Ga. 2006) (“The State’s release of its punitive damages claim as parens patriae 
precludes plaintiffs from pursuing the same claim for punitive damages in this action.”); 
Fabiano v. Philip Morris Inc., 862 N.Y.S.2d 487, 490 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008). 
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specifically, class actions.262 Preclusion is also problematic in terms 
of private and public actions because the enforcers have different 
incentives and operate under different procedural regimes. As AGs 
are increasingly stepping into the traditional domain of private 
enforcers to compensate private injuries in parens patriae actions, 
there is reason for concern about inadequate settlements, 
particularly in light of their potential for preclusion.263 
Inadequate settlements are particularly problematic if parens 
patriae actions preclude private action, because state residents may 
be stuck with inadequate compensation without receiving the 
procedural protections that class members receive before being 
bound to a settlement.264 Unlike class actions, there are generally 
few procedural protections in place for parens patriae group 
members, even though they may be the real parties of interest in 
the action.265 Notice of the action is generally not provided to 
parens patriae group members, nor do they have the opportunity 
to opt out of the action, as class members would in private class 
actions.266 Courts are also required to approve class action 
settlements, whereas state law varies on whether courts play a role 
in the approval of state settlement, with many state courts playing 
no role at all in approving the settlement.267 Because parens patriae 
actions do not have the procedural protections of class actions, it is 
problematic to preclude state residents from bringing private 
action, even if it might reduce piggybacking. 
 
 262. For example, class actions may not be certified because a court may consider a 
parens patriae action to be “superior” to class actions. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); Cox, supra 
note 127, at 2369–73; Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 26, at 501–06. Another example 
is when AGs may negotiate settlements that require parens patriae members to waive their 
rights to private action as a condition of receiving compensation, which precludes 
subsequent private action. See Cox, supra note 127, at 2374–79. 
 263. See Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 26, at 491. 
 264. See id. at 501–06; Adam S. Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 500, 
531 (2011) (discussing claims preclusion in the context of government agencies seeking 
settlements on behalf of citizens). 
 265. See Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 26, at 501–06. Others have also argued 
that there is a lack of procedural protections when federal agencies provide monetary 
compensation in public enforcement. See Zimmerman, supra note 264, at 571–72. 
 266. However, a notable exception is the antitrust context, which under federal law and 
several state statutes requires similar procedures as private class actions such as notice and 
the ability to opt out. See Cox, supra note 127, at 2346 n.179. 
 267. See Cox, supra note 127, at 2355, 2371; Dishman, supra note 26. 
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Preclusion of state action is also problematic because of the 
agency costs that arise in class actions that can leave class members 
undercompensated. Agency costs occur in a private class action 
when the entrepreneurial class counsel steps into the role of the 
principal, while the client takes on the attributes of the agent.268 This 
role reversal becomes particularly problematic when attorneys are 
guided by their own self-interest and class members are in a poor 
position to monitor their attorney’s opportunistic behavior.269 
When this occurs, class counsel may accept sweetheart deals. 
Because of the danger that class members may be inadequately 
compensated and corporations will not be deterred by the class 
action, precluding state action seeking compensation for state 
residents is also problematic. 
D. Partnership-Based Solutions 
The best potential solution to remedy the piggybacking 
problem is to have better enforcement partnerships and 
enforcement guidance among enforcers, including among states in 
multistate actions.270 In particular, state and federal partnerships 
and guidance about coordination may be able to ameliorate the 
effects of enforcement piggybacking and piling on. When public 
enforcers coordinate together through policies and partnerships, 
they can reduce the harms of duplicative actions while at the same 
time enjoying the efficiencies of pooling resources and expertise in 
enforcement actions. 
Federal-state working groups have been examples of 
cooperative federal-state enforcement that include coordination 
between multiple federal agencies, in addition to a multistate 
action. For example, the Residential Mortgage Backed Securities 
(RMBS) Working Group was a coordinated federal and state 
working group created in 2012 with a mandate to investigate and 
bring actions based on fraud and abuse in the RMBS market that 
helped lead to the 2008 financial crisis.271 The RMBS Working 
 
 268. See Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 50, at 82–83. 
 269. See id. 
 270. See Minzner, supra note 34, at 2172 (“Enforcers need to collaborate and coordinate 
enforcement actions. Other scholars have strongly advocated for coordination of 
enforcement functions in specific contexts.”). 
 271. See Totten, The Enforcers, supra note 10, at 1648–49. 
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Group brought a series of enforcement actions during and in the 
wake of the Great Recession against Wall Street banks for their role 
in the packaging and securitizing of RMBS. In 2013, the RMBS 
Working Group settled its first action against JPMorgan for $13 
billion, which at the time was the largest settlement against a single 
entity in American history.272 Following the JPMorgan settlement, 
the RMBS Working Group brought a quick succession of cases 
against other Wall Street banks based on similar RMBS theories. 
The RMBS Working Group settled with Citigroup in 2014 ($7 
billion),273 Bank of America in 2014 ($16.65 billion),274 Morgan 
Stanley in 2016 ($2.6 billion),275 Goldman Sachs in 2016 ($5.06 
billion),276 and Credit Suisse in 2017 ($5.28 billion).277 The RMBS 
Working Group is an example of a coordinated approach between 
a federal and a multistate group and could be a template for other 
joint law enforcement groups to handle other important issues. 
Enforcers can create policies that encourage enforcement 
cooperation and address concerns about duplicative actions. For 
example, the Department of Justice recently included a new policy 
in its U.S. Attorney’s manual regarding coordination among 
enforcers and DOJ departments to address concerns about piling 
on and piggybacking. The policy entitled “Coordination of 
Corporate Resolution Penalties in Parallel and/or Joint 
Investigations and Proceedings Arising from the Same 
 
 272. JPMorgan Press Release, supra note 177. 
 273. Federal and State Partners Secure Record $7 Billion Global Settlement with Citigroup for 
Misleading Investors About Securities Containing Toxic Mortgages, U.S. DEP’T JUST.  
(July 14, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-federal-and-state-
partners-secure-record-7-billion-global-settlement. 
 274. Bank of America Press Release, supra note 177. 
 275. Morgan Stanley Agrees to Pay $2.6 Billion Penalty in Connection with Its Sale of 
Residential Mortgage Backed Securities, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Feb. 11, 2016), https://www. 
justice.gov/opa/pr/morgan-stanley-agrees-pay-26-billion-penalty-connection-its-sale-
residential-mortgage-backed. 
 276. Goldman Sachs Agrees to Pay More than $5 Billion in Connection with Its Sale of 
Residential Mortgage Backed Securities, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Apr. 11, 2016), https://www. 
justice.gov/opa/pr/goldman-sachs-agrees-pay-more-5-billion-connection-its-sale-
residential-mortgage-backed. 
 277. Credit Suisse Agrees to Pay $5.28 Billion in Connection with its Sale of Residential 
Mortgage-Backed Securities, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.justice. 
gov/opa/pr/credit-suisse-agrees-pay-528-billion-connection-its-sale-residential-mortgage-
backed. Importantly, Credit Suisse has only settled with federal entities and has not yet 
settled with the states of New York and New Jersey. 
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Misconduct”278 will address the “practice of different enforcement 
and regulatory agencies ‘piling on’ with duplicative financial 
penalties for the same corporate misconduct.”279 The new policy 
aims to discourage piling on by instructing DOJ components—for 
example, the Civil and Criminal Divisions and U.S. Attorneys’ 
Offices—to coordinate with each other to avoid disproportionate 
fines and penalties in cases against corporate defendants. It 
reminds Department attorneys of their “ethical obligation” not to 
use enforcement authority “unfairly to extract” additional civil or 
administrative monetary payments.280 In addition, the policy 
directs federal prosecutors to make efforts to coordinate with other 
federal regulators and, where practicable, with state, local, and 
foreign enforcement agencies and consider the amount of fines, 
penalties, and forfeitures paid to other federal, state, local, or 
foreign enforcement authorities that are seeking to resolve a case 
with a company for the same misconduct.281 The policy also directs 
the DOJ to consider  
all relevant factors in determining whether coordination and 
apportionment between Department components and with other 
enforcement authorities allows the interests of justice to be fully 
vindicated. Relevant factors may include, for instance, the 
egregiousness of a company’s misconduct; statutory mandates 
regarding penalties, fines, and/or forfeitures; the risk of 
unwarranted delay in achieving a final resolution; and the 
adequacy and timeliness of a company’s disclosures and its 
cooperation with the Department, separate from any such 
disclosures and cooperation with other relevant enforcement 
authorities.282 
The DOJ also has a working group—DOJ Working Group on 
Corporate Enforcement & Accountability— that is responsible for 
the new policy on enforcement coordination.  
 
 278. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL, § 1-12.100 (May 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-1-12000-coordination-parallel-criminal-civil-regulatory-
and-administrative-proceedings. 
 279. New DOJ Policy Will Curb “Piling On” Multiple Penalties for Same Corporate 
Misconduct, LATHAM & WATKINS 1, (May 14, 2018), https://www.lw.com/thought 
Leadership/DOJ-policy-curb-piling-on-multiple-penalties-same-corporate-misconduct. 
 280. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL, § 1-12.100. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. 
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States could benefit from enforcement guidelines in multistate 
actions that encourage not only interstate cooperation but also 
cooperation with other enforcers.  Such policies may also encourage 
leading states and multistate groups to consider the fines and 
penalties that have already been paid to other enforcers as they 
consider bringing action and proposed settlements. Policies could 
also provide guidance on how states should contribute to 
multistate actions, how to apportion settlements, and how to 
approach attorneys’ fees in settlements. These policies could 
encourage greater transparency in multistate actions and reduce 
the amount of piggybacking in multistate actions. The National 
Association for Attorneys General (NAAG) has facilitated 
multistate actions such as the NAAG Multistate Antitrust Task 
Force. NAAG also has standing committees, such as the Consumer 
Protection Committee, that could play a role in coordinating 
multistate actions. NAAG could also form a task force or committee 
specifically to consider coordinating with other enforcers and with 
states in multistate actions. Such a task force could make 
recommendations on how multistate actions could avoid 
duplicative actions or piling on.  
The main drawback to advocating greater partnerships and 
policies encouraging cooperation is that they are voluntary by 
nature. Further, coordination requires effort and is not costless and 
the effort and cost of coordination increases with the number of 
enforcers.283 That being said, the successes of joint federal-
multistate working groups and the Department of Justice policy 
may pave the way for future coordination among enforcers to 
prevent piggybacking in multistate actions and in the broader 
multienforcer system. 
CONCLUSION 
Achieving the optimal amount of enforcement in a 
multienforcer system is an ongoing issue of debate among scholars 
and policymakers. Enforcement piggybacking among federal, state, 
and private enforcers has played a major role in the debate. 
However, this debate has not adequately considered the rise of 
multistate actions and this unique form of state enforcement 
 
 283. See Rose, Multienforcer Approach, supra note 7, at 2205. 
002.DISHMAN_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/14/20  1:53 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2019 
472 
 
piggybacking. The piggybacking that occurs in multistate actions 
considered in the multienforcer system can serve to over-enforce in 
certain types of cases and underenforce in others, threatening to 
undermine the traditional comparative advantage of states in a 
multienforcer system. However, better enforcement coordination 
and partnerships can help better utilize multistate action to serve 
the purposes of deterrence and compensation and better calibrate 
the levels of enforcement in a multienforcer system. 
 
